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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the discipline of forensic document examination requires
specialized knowledge with respect to paper, ink, printing methods,
detecting alterations and page substitutions, deciphering indented writing,
and other subject matters relevant to determining the authenticity or source
of a given document, the bulk of a document examiner’s work involves
comparison of handwriting of various kinds. This Article will focus only on
the handwriting comparison aspect of document examination since that is
what has drawn the most attention and criticism with respect to issues of
validity and reliability.
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In writing this Article, it was not lost on me that the person whose career
and contributions are being celebrated in this Symposium is more
knowledgeable about forensic handwriting analysis than any other nonpractitioner and, regrettably, more knowledgeable than far too many
practitioners of this discipline. Many of Professor Michael Risinger’s
contributions to the relevant literature are routinely cited by courts as
authoritative references with respect to seminal issues pertaining to the
validity and reliability of forensic handwriting analysis.1 I consider myself
fortunate and privileged to be able to count Michael Risinger as a friend, and
even more fortunate to have benefited from his wisdom and insight over
many, many years. His viewpoints and critical commentary, more than
anything else, have shaped, and in many instances confirmed, my own views
as a practicing forensic document examiner (FDE).
By way of introduction, I am a third-generation FDE in private practice
for more than forty years, who has also experienced the trials and tribulations
of serving the public as a state prosecutor. My education and training in the
forensic sciences and the law was comprehensive and multifaceted. It taught
me how to think critically when evaluating data or evidence and to consider
alternative possibilities, and it reinforced the importance of maintaining
neutrality when embarking upon any truth-seeking endeavor. In my chosen
field of forensic science, I was fortunate to receive my principal training
from an internationally recognized expert in forensic document examination,

1

See, e.g., D. MICHAEL RISINGER, Handwriting Identification, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David L. Faigman et al., eds., 2d
ed. 2002); D. Michael Risinger, Appendix: Cases Involving the Reliability of Handwriting
Identification Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477 (2007); D.
Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or, a Fool’s Errand, by One of the Fools: How I
Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and “Forensic
Science” in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,
43 TULSA L. REV. 447 (2007); D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance,
of the Boundary Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness
Reliability, 52 VILL. L. REV. 679 (2004); D. Michael Risinger & Mark P. Denbeaux, Kumho
Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 15 (2003); D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson &
Robert Rosenthal, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science:
Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002); D. Michael
Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co.
v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 (2000); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert
Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99
(2000); D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Brave New “PostDaubert World”—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998); D.
Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Courtroom: Daubert
Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); D. Michael Risinger,
Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification “Expertise,” 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731
(1989).
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Hanna F. Sulner, who happened to be my mother.2 I received supplemental
training from a retired FBI document examiner and numerous other
document examiners and forensic scientists trained in the public and private
sectors in various continuing education programs over the years.
Over the last twenty-five years, I have been actively involved in efforts
to develop meaningful consensus standards establishing best practices and
protocols for FDEs, especially with respect to the examination and
comparison of handwritten items, and how the findings and opinions derived
from such an examination should be expressed in reports and testimony. I
have also been active in exposing flawed and disingenuous testimony on the
part of presumptively well-qualified FDEs and in seeking to develop
practical measures and safeguards that would enhance the ability of FDEs,
lawyers and judges to minimize, if not eliminate, inaccurate and unreliable
opinion evidence from forensic handwriting analysis.
This Article endeavors to improve awareness and enhance the legal and
judicial responses to critically flawed evidence from handwriting experts by
providing lawyers and trial judges with guidelines for determining when
evidence from even presumptively well-qualified handwriting experts is
unreliable and should be excluded.
2
Hanna F. Sulner received her training as a document examiner in Europe. From the
age of 16, she studied at the elbow of her father, Professor Julius Fischhof, a pioneer in
handwriting analysis who settled in Budapest, Hungary after World War I and won a
reputation as Eastern Europe’s foremost expert on questioned documents. She studied
Criminology in Budapest and in Germany and received a special degree qualifying her to
teach the subject of Questioned Documents at the University of Budapest law school. Taking
over her father’s work after his death in 1944, she quickly inherited his reputation as a
meticulous professional as well as his position as official handwriting and document expert
to Hungary’s courts, police, and military, which she held until February 6, 1949, when she
and her husband, Laszlo, escaped to Austria with the aid of American and British intelligence
agencies. Four days later, they surfaced in Vienna and achieved international notoriety by
denouncing the February 1949 trial of Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty on treason and other
charges as a farce, and by displaying microfilms of documents which they had smuggled out
of Hungary and which revealed the Communist Government’s machinations to discredit and
frame the Cardinal by forging his signatures on a purported confession and other incriminating
documents. After immigrating to the United States, she promptly resumed her career as an
examiner of questioned documents. From 1950 until her death in 1999, Hanna F. Sulner
worked in New York as one of the nation’s leading authorities on disputed documents,
testifying in civil and criminal cases in various state and federal courts throughout the United
States and elsewhere, rarely for the losing side. See Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Hanna F.
Sulner, 81, Expert Drawn Into Mindszenty Plot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 1999),
http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/19/us/hanna-f-sulner-81-expert-drawn-into-mindszentyplot.html?mcubz=3. Her professional publications appeared in scientific and legal journals
in Europe as well as in such noted American legal periodicals as the American Bar Association
Journal and Criminal Law Review. She authored a well-recognized 400-page reference book,
DISPUTED DOCUMENTS: NEW METHODS FOR EXAMINING QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS (1966), and
Forged, Altered and Substituted Medical Records, a comprehensive article that appeared in
the October 1971 issue of Trauma, an authoritative Medico-Legal journal published by
Matthew Bender & Co., New York.
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Part II of this Article discusses the foundational tenets that have
traditionally been espoused to support the discipline of forensic handwriting
analysis, and why there is a need to replace those tenets with less absolutist
statements derived from principles of neuroscience and human motor control
theory.
Part III provides an overview of the essential requirements for
performing reliable forensic handwriting examinations, which lawyers and
judges need to know and practitioners should adhere to. A reported opinion
from a case in which I was involved is used to illustrate the danger of tunnel
vision in any forensic handwriting investigation (focusing only on the
“target” of the investigation).
Part IV seeks to illuminate the impact of cognitive bias on forensic
handwriting analysis by discussing the biasing influences that can
improperly taint and sway an examiner’s decision-making process and
render unreliable his or her opinions and testimony, and by providing an
overview of the various methods and techniques available for minimizing, if
not eliminating, such adverse influences.
Part V examines the three different types of forensic casework peer
reviews (administrative review, technical review, and verification); it
addresses the relevance of verification in evaluating the reliability of opinion
evidence, and discusses recent case law explaining why testimony
concerning any type of “review” performed by a non-testifying expert
constitutes improper bolstering3 and/or inadmissible hearsay.
Part VI discusses the gatekeeping obligation imposed upon trial judges
to screen and exclude unreliable evidence proffered by handwriting experts,
and what lawyers need to do, but all too often fail to do, to facilitate the
judge’s role as gatekeeper. Several appellate court decisions are reviewed to
illustrate instances of unreliable handwriting identification opinion evidence
that escaped recognition and successful challenge at the trial level, as well as
one recent district court case in which the proffered testimony of a
handwriting expert was properly excluded by the gatekeeper.

3
Generally, a party may not bolster or support the credibility of its witness until that
credibility has been affirmatively impeached by the opposing party, and even then, it can only
do so with evidence that does not violate the hearsay rule. See generally EDWARD J.
IMWINKELRIED, PAUL C. GIANNELLI, FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN, FREDRIC I. LEDERER & LIESA
RICHTER, COURTROOM CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 702 (6th ed. 2016). As discussed in Part V.C,
infra, several court decisions have held that a witness’s testimony about casework peer review
by someone not testifying is inadmissible on the ground of “improper bolstering” of the
credibility of a witness on direct examination in advance of any attack on the witness’s
credibility. However, I am grateful to Professor Edward Imwinkelried for pointing out that
the more appropriate legal basis for excluding such attempted corroboration testimony would
be hearsay outside of any hearsay exception.
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Finally, Part VII concludes with my thoughts and perspectives on what
can and should be done to further enhance the reliability of handwriting
identification opinion evidence that is presented in civil and criminal cases.
This Part also discusses what can and should be done to remedy the
inequality of resources in criminal cases that effectively deprives defendants
and their counsel of the ability to acquire the expertise needed to properly
expose flaws and weaknesses in opinion evidence proffered by prosecution
handwriting experts.
II. THE NEED TO REPLACE THE SUPPOSED FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
SUPPORTING FORENSIC HANDWRITING EXPERTISE WITH A MORE
DEFENSIBLE SET OF PRINCIPLES BASED ON NEUROSCIENCE
Forensic document examiners (FDEs) have traditionally premised the
claim of scientific validity and reliability of handwriting identification on
two asserted principles or tenets: (1) handwriting is unique, meaning that no
two people write exactly alike (the principle of Uniqueness or Inter-writer
Variability); and (2) no person can produce an exact duplicate of his or her
signature or write exactly the same way twice (the principle of Intra-writer
Variability).4
Given the strong form in which these two tenets are usually expressed,
their absolute truth is by no means obvious (nor is it necessary for the process
of handwriting analysis to yield probative and reliable results under many
circumstances, as we will see). But even assuming their truth, why does this
establish the credentials of the process of handwriting identification as a
science?
I have always maintained, contrary to the position espoused by most
FDEs, that handwriting identification is not a science, but a technical skill
which, if performed properly, can have great probative value, for reasons I
will go into later in this Article.5 Such views have long made me an outsider
to the “guild” identified and described in 1997 by Professor Risinger and his

4
See, e.g., Diane Harrison, Ted M. Burkes & Danielle P. Sieger, Handwriting
Examination: Meeting the Challenges of Science and the Law, FORENSIC SCI. COMMNC’NS
(Oct. 2009), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/oct2009
/review/2009_10_review02.htm/. These two tenets are sometimes supplemented by a third,
that no person can exceed his or her writing skill level at a given point in time (the principle
of Writer Skill Threshold Limitation), a principle which is virtually tautological, self-proving,
and requires no validation. However, it does not apply in the factual context of most cases,
and does leave open the question of how to determine the skill level of both the questioned
writing and the candidates for writership. Id.
5
When I so testified before U.S. District Court Judge Miriam Cedarbaum in Boulé v.
Hutton, 138 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), Judge Cedarbaum interrupted my testimony to
comment that during her career on the bench, she had heard testimony from many handwriting
experts, and I was the first one to testify that handwriting identification was not a “science.”
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coauthors.6 Now, however, my longstanding position that absolutist
statements concerning uniqueness and intra-writer variability are as yet
unproven, and likely unprovable, appears to be gaining more respectability
as academic scientists examine the foundations of the traditional patternmatching forensic disciplines and come to broadly similar conclusions. In
addition, recent federal district court decisions excluding or limiting the
proffered testimony of handwriting experts in criminal and civil cases have
likewise concluded that regardless of whether handwriting analysis is
characterized as science or technical skill, there has been inadequate testing
and insufficient data to support the scientific validity of the two fundamental
principles (Uniqueness and Intra-writer Variability) that have forever been
espoused by virtually all FDEs as the underlying basis for handwriting
identification.
For instance, in the recent case United States v. Kelly,7 the handwriting
at issue involved cursive handwriting. In limiting the proffered expert
testimony to a discussion of the expert’s methodology and the similarities
and differences he observed in handwriting features, the court noted:
In his testimony, Mr. Shiver stated that in order to definitively
prove that no individual writes exactly like any other, one would
have to collect the handwriting of every person. Mr. Shiver also
stated that collecting such data is practically impossible. The
inability to prove this tenet with certainty does not in and of itself
6
Professor Risinger and his coauthors described the guild mentality in handwriting
expertise circles in D. Michael Risinger, Michael J. Saks & Mark P. Denbeaux, Brave New
“Post-Daubert World: A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 408
(1998) (commenting on Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the
Post-Daubert World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997)):
Professor Moenssens seems to have a number of goals in his article:
(1) to alert the reader to doctrinal differences and differences in training
and experience among people called as handwriting experts in
American courts; (2) to establish the superiority of one doctrine, one
method of training, and one group; (3) to recapture the label of
“science,” with its attendant rhetorical power, for handwriting
identification, at least when undertaken by the right group; and (4) to
guard against any residual risk that such disciplines might be found too
unreliable to be the subject of testimony, first by trashing the credibility
of critics by any available means and, second, by proposing a standard
of “reliability” tailored both to insure admissibility and to establish his
favored group as the monopoly guild. Finally, the underlying hope that
appears to be reflected in the Moenssens article is that, if the rest of
these goals are accomplished, the practical effect will be to ensure that
fact finders are not provided with any skeptical interpretation of either
the methodology or the available validity data (or lack thereof) from
any person not certified by the guild.
Id.
7
United States v. Kelly, No. 4:15-cr-01632 (D. Ariz. 2015).
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render Mr. Shiver’s identification opinion unreliable. However,
the two studies Mr. Shiver states support this tenet do not provide
a sufficient basis for his opinion. One study leads to the
conclusion that within a sample of 1500 writers, very few write
similarly; the other leads to the conclusion that handwriting is not
determined by a person’s genetics. Without more, this Court
cannot conclude from these studies that there is sufficient data to
support an identification opinion.8
Similarly, in United States v. Johnsted,9 the proffered hand printing
identification testimony of Gale Bolsover, a U.S. Postal Service FDE, was
excluded in its entirety. The court cited the following reasons for excluding
the testimony:


The studies cited by the Government and its expert fail to
support the principles of Uniqueness (Inter-writer Variability)
and Intra-Writer Variability that are claimed as the
foundational underpinnings of handwriting analysis.10



Bolsover conceded that she knew of no studies supporting the
second foundational principle that no individual writes exactly
the same way twice.11

A. Handwriting Pattern Recognition—An Everyday Occurrence in
the Life of the Ordinary Person
While there has been some progress in accepting that the absolutist
statements historically claimed as the foundational tenets of forensic
handwriting analysis are not capable of empirical proof, there is still some
resistance within the FDE community to abandoning these absolutist
statements in favor of more modest, and more defensible, claims concerning
the diagnosticity of handwriting comparison in regard to various different
tasks which are presented in actual practice, based on a more nuanced
understanding of such claims.
Handwriting recognition is a phenomenon that ordinary people are
invariably familiar with and routinely encounter in their daily lives, which
renders it unlike any other forensic pattern recognition phenomenon.
Common experience confirms that under some circumstances, we can
8
9
10
11

Id. at 4–5 (emphasis added).
30 F. Supp. 3d 814 (W.D. Wis. 2013).
Id. at 822.
Id. at 818.
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recognize a writer by means of visual cues appearing in his or her writing.
Usually, such writing belongs to a relative, friend or co-worker whose
writing pattern has been unconsciously stored and imbedded in the visual
memory center of our brain after numerous viewings, and is thereafter
subject to automatic recall upon viewing it again. Presumably, for this
recognition to be achieved, the brain is making decisions based on features
that pictorially characterize the writing. For lay persons, this process is
relatively straightforward as only a limited number of pictorial memories are
in play and an incorrect judgment may have no adverse consequences. For
forensic handwriting experts, every sample of handwriting presented, be it
questioned or known, presents a set of handwriting features that are
unfamiliar and have not been stored in the observer’s visual memory, which
therefore requires methodical examinations of the sets of questioned and
known handwriting independently to ascertain the features that characterize
each set.
B. Preliminary Observations on the Classification of Handwriting
Forms
There have been many systems proposed for the classification of
handwriting, some quite elaborate, and often with different purposes in mind.
These are well surveyed by Roy A. Huber and A. M. Headrick in their
treatise Handwriting Identification: Facts and Fundamentals (1999).12 For
this paper, it is best to stick to fundamentals. Signatures are properly
classified separately because they represent a special class of writing that is
personal to the writer in many physical and emotional dimensions, and thus
presents both special opportunities and special problems in determining
whether a putative signature by a specified person was made by that person
(is authentic13). Signatures may be text-based, stylized (symbolic); or mixed
text-stylized. Non-signature generation of written letters has been described
by Huber and Headrick as falling into four principle categories: (1) Cursive
writing, in which letters are connected; (2) “Manuscript” writing, in which
letters are disconnected and are designed similar to upper and lower case
printing characters; (3) Hand lettering, sometimes called block printing or
block lettering, in which letters are separately structured and often designed
as upper case letters; and (4) Composites usually combining cursive writing
and “manuscript” writing, with some letters connected and others not.14 It is
12
ROY A. HUBER & A.M. HEADRICK, HANDWRITING IDENTIFICATION: FACTS AND
FUNDAMENTALS 152–60 (1999).
13
“Authenticity” in this context is a specialized type of writership attribution in which a
signature is attributed to the person whose name or alleged stylization appears on the
document. A signature not attributed to that putative author is not authentic, or inauthentic.
14
HUBER & HEADRICK, supra note 12, at 95–101.
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important to note here that it is quite common for a person’s ordinary hand
to be manuscript writing, and quite uncommon for it to be hand lettering.
Both of these, not being connected cursive, are often misleadingly lumped
together as “hand printing” even though they present different sub-tasks
from the standpoint of determining the sufficiency of features for purposes
of writer attribution.
C. Principles of Human Motor Control Theory as the Foundational
Basis for Forensic Handwriting Expertise
Handwriting is an over-learned skill that becomes automatic and
habitual (it’s practiced until the writer “can’t get it wrong”). For example,
the image of your signature and the specific movement sequence required to
produce that image are imbedded in your brain’s motor control memory
centers. Hence, if you were to sign your signature in the air with your
forefinger or foot acting as the writing instrument, your forefinger or foot
would follow the same movement sequence that is followed when signing
your name on paper with pen in hand. Since handwriting is a behavioral
artifact of the human motor control process, once you understand that
process you can draw reasonable inferences from examining its byproduct.
1. Complexity Theory as Applied to Handwriting
Numerous human motor control studies conducted by neuroscientists
have confirmed the difficulty of repeating or simulating a series of rapidly
connected movements (“Complexity Theory”).15 As applied to handwriting,
the following principles can be reliably stated:
A. The more complex a handwriting sample is, the more difficult it becomes
for others to simulate it without leaving behind tell-tale indicia of
simulation (e.g., line tremor, unnatural pen lifts, gaps or hesitations,
spatial and proportional disturbances).

15

See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Brault & Rejean Plamondon, Complexity Measure of Handwritten
Curves: Modeling of Dynamic Signature Forgery, 23 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYS., MAN, &
CYBERNETICS 400 (1993); Henry S.R. Kao, Daniel T.L. Shek & Elbert S.P. Lee, Control
Modes and Task Complexity in Tracing and Handwriting Performance, 54 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 69 (1983); Ruud G.J. Meulenbroek, & Gerard P. van Galen, PerceptualMotor Complexity of Printed and Cursive Letters, 58 J. EXPERIMENTAL EDUC. 95 (1990);
Ruldolf E. van der Platts & Gerard P. van Galen, Effects of Spatial and Motor Demands in
Handwriting, 22 J. MOTOR BEHAV. 361 (1990); Gerard P. van Galen, Structural Complexity
of Motor Patterns: A Study on Reaction Times and Movement Times of Handwritten Letters,
46 PSYCHOL. RES. 49 (1984); Alan M. Wing, Response Timing in Handwriting, in
INFORMATION PROCESSING IN MOTOR CONTROL AND LEARNING (George E. Stelmach ed.,
1978).
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B. The more complex a handwriting sample, the more likely it will contain
features that deviate from other writers.16
C. The greater the number of times the pen is required to change direction,
the longer the line length over which turning points occur, and the greater
the overall speed of execution, the more complex the visual image
appears.
Empirical support exists for the above stated complexity theory
relationships, and the assessment of the complexity of handwriting has been
reported in related fields of research.17 Research studies have validated the
ability of FHEs to evaluate the parameters that contribute to the perceived
complexity of handwriting.18
Examples of Signatures of Varying Complexity
Three signatures of varying complexity (simple, moderately complex,
and very complex) are displayed below:

16

This relationship is related to the theory of class and individual characteristics that has
traditionally been offered as an underpinning for forensic handwriting identification.
17
Linda C. Alewijnse, C. Elisa van den Heuvel & Reinoud D. Stoel, Analysis of
Signature Complexity, 21 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 37 (2011); See generally
MICHAEL P. CALIGURI & LINTON A. MOHAMMED, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF HANDWRITING:
APPLICATIONS FOR FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION (2012).
18
Bryan J. Found, Douglas Rogers & Robert Schmittat, Recovering Dynamic
Information From Static Handwriting Traces Using Angular Differential Software, 6 J.
QUESTIONED DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 17 (1997); Huub J.J. Hardy, Dynamics of the Writing
Movement: Physical Modelling and Practical Applications, 5 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT
EXAMINATION 1 (1992); Tahnee N. Dewhurst, Bryan J. Found & Douglas Rogers, The
Relationship Between Quantitatively Modelled Signature Complexity Levels and Forensic
Document Examiners’ Qualitative Opinions on Casework, 18 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT
EXAMINATION 21 (2007); Bryan J. Found & Douglas Rogers, The Forensic Investigation of
Signature Complexity, in HANDWRITING AND DRAWING RESEARCH: BASIC AND APPLIED ISSUES
483–92 (Marvin L. Simner et al. eds., 1996); Emily J. Will, Pilot Study: Inferring Relative
Speed of Writing From the Static Trace, 22 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 55 (2012).
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Figure 1. Signatures of Varying Complexity
The bottom two signatures in Figure 1 above belong to the star
entertainer, Rihanna. The first was signed early in her career, the second
after she became an international celebrity. Recognizing the inherent value
of her signature on memorabilia, like many other sports and entertainment
celebrities, Rihanna intentionally developed a highly complex signature to
make it more difficult for would-be forgers to successfully simulate her
signature.
D. Establishing Reliability by Demonstrating a Common Sense
Justification for the Particular Task Performed by the Forensic
Handwriting Expert
As discussed above, the reliability of forensic handwriting analysis
cannot be predicated upon the uniqueness of handwriting. Rather, it must be
predicated upon (a) the perceptual ability of FDEs to observe and detect
subtle similarities and differences between two sets of writings; and (b) their
diagnostic ability to make reasonable inferences from such an analysis
regarding the likelihood that the two sets of writings were written by the
same or different writers.
The standard for admissibility of proffered expert testimony varies
somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For the purposes of this Article,
I will concentrate on admissibility criteria under Federal Rule of Evidence
702. For expert testimony to be admissible under FRE 702, the trial judge
must have sufficient reason to believe that (a) the expert possesses sufficient
skill in regard to performing a particular task at hand, and (b) reliable
inferences can be drawn from the reliable performance of that particular task.
Under FRE 702, as under Daubert and Kumho, trial courts must scrutinize
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not only the principles and methods used by the expert, but also whether
those principles and methods have been properly applied to the facts of the
case. Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively
applies to all experts or in every case,19 and Kumho acknowledges that
whatever the claim of expertise may be, when you’re dealing with skill
claims, the belief warrant need not necessarily come from empirical testing.20
A demonstrable critical common sense justification for a warranted belief in
reliability supplants the need for independent black box or statistical
validation studies, even though such studies are always preferable.
The fact that the ordinary person is very familiar with handwriting and
can easily understand the mechanism that produces it lessens the necessity
for formal validation of a handwriting expert’s ability to make accurate
decisions regarding signature authenticity or handwriting source
attributions.21 Once you understand the mechanism by which a phenomenon
is produced, you can readily see when an opinion based upon that mechanism
is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in evidence under a common sense
approach. Critical common sense, the nature of the evidence being analyzed
and characterized, and the ability of the ordinary person to comprehend and
independently assess the expert’s characterization of that evidence provides
a sufficient belief warrant for the validity of the characterization. For
example, demonstrable evidence of shared characteristics between two sets
of handwriting can provide a strong basis for a reasonable person to find that
both sets of writings were made by the same person beyond a reasonable
doubt.22
Kumho Tire makes it clear that under the mandate of Daubert,
evaluation must be directed to the reliability of the expertise in the specific
“task at hand” at issue in the case.23 Let’s assume that the task at hand
requires distinguishing natural writing tremor from faked (artificial) tremor
in a questioned (disputed) signature. Let us further assume that the tremor
observed in the stroke pattern of the known signatures of the subject writer
19

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
Id. at 150.
21
See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The
ability of juries to perform the crucial visual comparisons relied upon by handwriting experts
cuts against the danger of undue prejudice from the mystique attached to ‘experts.’”).
22
“A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based on reason, logic, common sense, or
experience. It is a doubt that an ordinary reasonable person has after carefully weighing all
of the evidence, and is a doubt of the sort that would cause him or her to hesitate to act in
matters of importance in his or her own life. It may arise from the evidence, or from the lack
of evidence, or from the nature of the evidence.” U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.06 (Apr. 2015), http://www.ca3.uscourts.
gov/sites/ca3/files/2012 Chapter 3 Rev.pdf.
23
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141. See analysis in Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand,”
supra note 1.
20
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reflects wiggly and irregular strokes indicating the writer’s inability to
control the writing instrument, whereas the tremor observed in the stroke
pattern of the questioned signature reflects a series of concatenated sharply
angled up and down strokes that look like shark’s teeth, indicating extreme
control over the writing instrument. In this instance, the neuroscience of
motor control provides an understanding of the mechanism that produces
handwriting and a common sense justification for the inference that the
questioned signature was written by someone who possessed motor control
rather than someone who lacked it.
E. Using Less Absolutist Propositions in Support of Forensic
Handwriting Expertise
As discussed above, the FDE community needs to abandon the theory
of uniqueness as the underpinning for forensic handwriting expertise and
replace it with a neuroscience model based upon human motor control
behavior and complexity theory. More modest fundamental principles
should be used as support for handwriting expertise, such as the following:
(1) Given an adequate amount of skillfully executed, complex (nonsimplistic) writing, the likelihood that handwriting by different
writers will be distinguishable from each other is far greater than
the likelihood that handwriting by different writers will be
indistinguishable from each other.24
(2) The smaller the source population of possible writers, the greater
the likelihood that a specific writer can be accurately identified as
the source of the questioned writing.

24
In discussing the neurobiological principles underlying handwriting variation, and the
principle that the more complex the writing, the harder it should be to simulate, and the less
chance of mistaking it for another individual’s handwriting, the late Bryan Found, a
pioneering Australian forensic document examiner (FDE) whose views were very much in
line with mine, likewise asserted that “under normal conditions, given a sufficient amount of
writings, no two skilled writers are likely to produce handwritten images that are exactly the
same in terms of the combination of construction, line quality, formation variation and text
structure features.” Bryan J. Found & Douglas Rogers, A Consideration of the Theoretical
Basis of Forensic Handwriting Examination: The Application of “Complexity Theory” to
Understanding the Basis of Handwriting Identification, 4 INT’L. J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT
EXAMINERS 109 (1998).
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III. LAWYERS AND JUDGES NEED TO KNOW (AND PRACTITIONERS NEED
TO OBEY) THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFORMING
RELIABLE FORENSIC HANDWRITING EXAMINATIONS
A. Suitability for Comparison and Presence of Sufficient
Discriminating Writing Features
Handwriting is an acquired skill involving a multifaceted perceptualmotor task in which neuromuscular commands direct a very complex set of
coordinated movements of the fingers, wrist, elbow and shoulder. The
discriminating features of writing include elements of style (e.g., letter
formations, spatial and proportional relationships between letters and words,
and formatting features) and execution (e.g., speed and fluidity of writing
movements). It is the totality (combination) of the discriminating, habitual
writing habits that forensic document examiners compare and evaluate in
cases involving handwriting identification and/or signature verification.
Essentially, the pictorial, structural and line quality features that are
perceived to characterize two sets of writing specimens are independently
assessed and then compared inter se to determine whether they are
sufficiently similar to support the hypothesis of common authorship or
sufficiently dissimilar to support the hypothesis that different writers
produced the two sets of writings.
At the outset of any handwriting investigation, the examiner makes
value judgments about whether the questioned writing is sufficiently devoid
of distortion or disguise to render it suitable for comparison purposes, and
whether it contains enough distinguishing features to support a decision
regarding source attribution.25 Such judgments are discretionary and
examiner dependent.
Once the questioned writing is adjudged to be suitable for comparison
purposes, the examiner then evaluates the quantity and quality of the
exemplar (known) writing to assess its adequacy for comparison purposes.
Let us consider signatures first. To determine whether a questioned
signature is genuine, a trained forensic handwriting expert focuses on the
intricate details that make up the component (structural) parts of the
signature and the relative speed and fluency (rhythm) with which those
details are executed. An attempt to duplicate the signature of another person
based upon a known sample or “model” of that person’s signature is referred
to as a forgery by simulation or simulated forgery. In so doing, the forger
attempts to duplicate the normal and natural writing habits and abilities of
25

In the case of the first (top) signature displayed in Figure 1, supra, it is so simplistic
that a would-be forger would have little difficulty producing a simulation that would escape
detection as a forgery. Hence, any conclusion concerning the authenticity of such a simplistic
signature should be considered unreliable and of no probative value.
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another while simultaneously discarding his or her own customary writing
habits and abilities.
A skilled signature, be it text-based, stylized, or a combination of both,
is the product of a series of concatenated curvilinear strokes. The number of
times the writing instrument is required to change direction and the relative
orientation of the curvilinear strokes within a given signature establish its
complexity. To imitate the precise writing movements so as to accurately
replicate the combination of curvilinear strokes found within a complex
signature of another person and to do so with the same relative speed of
execution and fluency found within that other person’s genuine signature(s)
is a task that is extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve. Hence, the
greater the complexity of the handwritten image, the more difficult it
becomes to successfully simulate it. Essentially, the difficulty encountered
in copying complex movements is the cornerstone of forensic signature
analysis.
B. Adequacy of Exemplars Used for Comparison Purposes
Obtaining an adequate number of samples of an individual’s normal
writing is an essential requirement in investigating whether or not such
individual authored a questioned or disputed handwritten item; these samples
are termed exemplars. The exemplars must be sufficient in quantity to
provide a sound basis for evaluating and ascertaining the natural range of
variation found within the subject individual’s handwriting or signature
pattern. Variations found within the same person’s writing or signature
pattern are often referred to as “intra-writer” differences, whereas “interwriter” differences refer to dissimilarities that are attributable to another
writer. In any case involving questioned writings or disputed signatures, the
critical task for the forensic document examiner is to ascertain whether
apparent differences are intra-writer differences indicative of common
authorship, or inter-writer differences evidencing different writers. The
significance of the essential requirements of this task will be highlighted in
one or more of the illustrative cases discussed later in this Article.
1. Contemporaneousness
Perhaps the most important factor in assembling good exemplars is
contemporaneousness. Ideally, the exemplars should be written as close as
possible to the alleged date(s) of preparation of the questioned writing(s).26
26
The ideal exemplars for handwriting comparisons are contemporaneous normal course
of business writings that conform to the same format and context as the questioned material,
i.e., prepared in the same writing style (cursive or printed), and containing the same characters,
letters, or words. The textual format of the exemplar writing needs to be similar to that
encountered in the questioned writing so that the examiner is “comparing apples to apples.”
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Contemporaneousness of the exemplar writing is particularly critical in those
instances where the examiner bases his or her opinion upon dissimilarities
observed between the questioned and exemplar writing. Best practices
require contemporaneous exemplars for comparison purposes because they
tend to be far more representative of the subject’s writing habits and skill at
the time the questioned item was purportedly written; as the time gap
between the exemplars and the questioned writing becomes greater, the
exemplars have the tendency to be less representative and more unreliable.
Hence, it should come as no surprise that a principal source of error in
disputed signature cases is when the handwriting expert bases an opinion of
forgery on exemplar signatures of a remote date or on an inadequate amount
of exemplar signatures.
2. Representative (Randomly Selected) Exemplars—Not SelfServing Exemplars “Cherry Picked” by a Writer
Disavowing Authorship
Best practices also require experts to reduce the likelihood that the
exemplar writing submitted to them for comparison purposes is self-serving
and not representative of the full range of writing features attributed to a
specific writer. For example, in a disputed signature case, if the process by
which exemplar signatures are selected permits a disclaiming signatory to
“cherry pick” the exemplars to be supplied for comparison purposes, the
selection process itself is tainted and inherently unreliable. The selection
process must allow for the random selection of exemplars to reduce the
likelihood that exemplars were selected with the intent to provide spurious
support for an unmeritorious claim of forgery. In many signature comparison
cases, upon obtaining a truly representative sampling of the disclaiming
party’s signature pattern, what at first glance were perceived as “apparent
differences” are oftentimes demonstrated and proven to be “normal
variations” within the same person’s signature pattern (intra-writer
differences), and hence prima facie proof of genuineness.
3. Obtaining and Examining Handwriting Exemplars from All
Persons of Interest in a Limited Pool of Plausible Writers
One of the cardinal sins committed in a forensic handwriting
investigation is to perform one-to-one comparisons between the handwriting
appearing in a questioned item and only the exemplar writing attributable to
the “suspect” or “target of the investigation,” especially when there exists a
limited pool of plausible writers. As a general principle, every effort should
The ideal exemplars for signature comparisons are signatures executed on a date
contemporaneous with the date of the questioned or disputed signature, and preferably on
documents of similar import and under comparable circumstances of execution.
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be made to keep the examiner “blinded” from learning the identity of the
suspect in a handwriting investigation as such contextual information can
unconsciously influence the perception and decision-making of the
handwriting expert, as described in Part IV of this Article. The need to
examine writing samples from others in the “web” of plausible writers
should be self-evident: it facilitates keeping the examiner blinded to the
“suspect” or person of greatest interest; it enables the examiner to see if other
writers display writing features similar to those observed in the questioned
writing(s); and it can serve to eliminate individuals as the writer of the
questioned writing. This is particularly important in cases involving hand
printing, which may not be as distinctive as cursive writing.
Early in my career, shortly after I stopped working as a state prosecutor
for the Queens County District Attorney’s Office, I was hired as a forensic
document examiner in what proved to be a case that attracted a lot of local
media coverage and reinforced my conviction that FDEs involved in
forensic handwriting investigations should always be required to examine
writing samples from other plausible writers or persons of potential interest,
and, to the extent possible, be precluded from receiving any case
information that is irrelevant to the handwriting comparison task they are
being asked to perform until the task is completed.
The case involved a high profile disciplinary hearing in which the
Westchester County Division of Public Safety charged Police Officer
William P. Shaughnessy with serious misconduct that could have led to job
termination as well as future criminal charges. John D. Ryan, a former New
York State prosecutor, was officially appointed as Special Hearing Officer
to hear and evaluate the evidence and report his findings and determination.
It was alleged that between February and December of 1981, Shaughnessy
was part of a conspiracy in which approximately two hundred (200) mail
subscription forms were fraudulently completed in the names of several
police officers and their spouses, resulting in hundreds of books and
magazines being sent to their homes and offices. Two of Shaughnessy’s
superior officers, Lt. Stephen Fischer and Sgt. James Fleming, received 95
and 78 such unsolicited mailings, apparently in retribution for their
involvement and cooperation in the so-called “cooping investigation,” a
clandestine NYPD Internal Affairs investigation of police officers sleeping
on the job, which resulted in charges being brought against twenty-two (22)
police officers and a great deal of unwanted media attention.
Shaughnessy was charged with the intent to defraud, harass, annoy, and
alarm others by falsely and fraudulently completing approximately ten of
these mail subscription order forms, eight in the name of Stephen Fisher and
two in the name of James Fleming. Far more serious was the allegation that
Shaughnessy and his co-conspirators cut the lug-nuts on Lieutenant
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Fleming’s personal automobile, which resulted in a near fatal accident on
April 3, 1981, when the left rear tire fell off while Fleming was driving on a
highway. Fleming testified that at around that same time, while at the office
of their same personal attorney on separate business, Fleming and
Shaughnessy had a conversation in which Shaughnessy expressed an opinion
that the mailings would never stop. Fleming was involved in the cancellation
of over 200 unsolicited mailings as well as the procedure utilized with
respect to forwarding evidence to the postal authority’s crime laboratory. He
enjoyed a friendly working relationship with Terry Loftus, the Postal
Inspector assigned to investigate the unsolicited mailings, having worked
with him for five years on stolen welfare check cases. Fleming was also
aware that Police Officer Robert Duncan was separately indicted in
connection with the cooping investigation and had pled guilty.
Shaughnessy, a recipient of the Bronze Medal of Honor for military
service in Viet Nam, was not indicted or even considered a suspect in the
cooping investigation. He adamantly denied writing, in whole or in part, any
mail subscription forms, all of which contained alphanumerical hand
printing. There was no eyewitness account of Shaughnessy’s involvement in
any of the activities with which he was charged, and no admissions of any
kind were made by him. As noted in the published decision of Special
Hearing Officer Ryan, “[t]his case turns on a proper analysis of the expert
testimony submitted by each party,”27 and “the testimony of each
handwriting expert was . . . , without a doubt, the most significant and
probative part of this case.”28
The County’s handwriting expert was Carl J. Raichle, a presumptively
well-qualified FDE employed by the U.S. Postal Crime Lab in New York
City.29 Mr. Raichle’s initial report, dated February 8, 1982, was based upon
his examination and comparison of the hand printing appearing in the ten
questioned mail subscription forms that Shaughnessy was charged with
writing and the known hand printing of Shaughnessy appearing in his memo
book and personnel folder. In this report, Mr. Raichle concluded that
Shaughnessy wrote seven out of the ten subscription forms at issue and that

27
In re Guido v. Shaughnessy, 1983 Extra LEXIS 3, at *28 (Westchester Cty., N.Y.
Dep’t Pub. Safety Nov. 18, 1983).
28
Id. at *36.
29
Mr. Raichle earned a B.S. in Police Science from John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
trained four years in the New York City Police Department Crime Lab’s Questioned
Documents Unit, attended FBI and U.S. Secret Service specialized courses, and was
employed as a forensic document examiner by the New York City Police Department Crime
Lab for four years and the U.S. Postal Crime Lab for six years. He was certified by the
American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (ABFDE) and testified approximately
thirty times in state and federal court. Id. at *15–16.
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“it is conceivable that Shaughnessy wrote [the other three].”30
Thereafter, Mr. Raichle requested and received request (demand)
exemplars that Shaughnessy provided to Postal Inspector Loftus following
Mr. Raichle’s first report. No other writer’s exemplars were submitted to or
requested by Mr. Raichle. Based upon these additional Shaughnessy
exemplars, Mr. Raichle issued his second report, dated June 10, 1982, which
now concluded that Shaughnessy wrote each of the ten mail subscription
forms he was charged with writing.
Mr. Raichle had also received a packet from Lt. James Fleming that
contained samples of P.O. Garret Morrison’s hand printing. Fleming
submitted these additional hand printing exemplars to Mr. Raichle because
Shaughnessy had claimed that his and Morrison’s hand printing were
similar.31 Mr. Raichle acknowledged that he never compared Morrison’s
hand printing to the hand printing on the questioned mail subscription forms
because Shaughnessy had already been identified as the author of the
forms.32
Nearly a year after issuing his second report, Mr. Raichle received for
analysis 10 additional mail subscription forms that Shaughnessy was not
formally charged with writing. This resulted in Mr. Raichle issuing a third
report, dated June 21, 1983, in which he concluded that at least four different
writers completed these ten additional mail subscription forms and that
Shaughnessy wrote four of them.
I was formally retained as a handwriting expert on behalf of
Respondent Shaughnessy in late December 1982. From the very start, I
insisted on obtaining exemplar hand printing from all the police officers in
Shaughnessy’s unit, including supervisory personnel, and that I be supplied
with all the mail subscription forms analyzed by Mr. Raichle. The fact that
Mr. Raichle never insisted on examining writing exemplars from writers
other than the charged party (Shaughnessy) was shocking to me given that
standard protocol (best practices) in any anonymous handwriting
investigation requires doing so. Sadly, thirty-five years later, this case still
serves as an excellent learning tool for experts, lawyers and judges because
it illustrates the importance of examining handwriting exemplars from all
30

Id. at *16.
During the investigative phase of the case, Police Officer Garrett T. Morrison, who
had access to the records and reports of various police officers, was shown each of the ten
original subscription forms at issue and denied authorship of each. At trial, Morrison
appeared under subpoena as a witness for Respondent Shaughnessy. When offered the
opportunity by Respondent’s attorney to provide handwriting exemplars, Morrison refused to
do so without a court order upon the advice of counsel. Id. at *20.
32
This is a prime example of target shifting and selective stopping. Morrison’s
handwriting was not compared to the questioned handwriting because the target,
Shaughnessy, was already identified.
31
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persons of interest when dealing with a limited population of plausible
writers and the dangers inherent in examining only those written by the prime
suspect in the investigation. This case also demonstrates the need to erect a
“Chinese wall” between the expert analyzing the evidence and the
investigator handling the case.
My analysis of the hand printing at issue revealed numerous significant
dissimilarities between the hand printing in question and the known hand
printing of Shaughnessy. These differences were readily observable when
reviewing either the post litem motem request exemplars provided by
Shaughnessy or his normal course of business exemplars that pre-dated the
case (ante litem motem exemplars). My opinion and testimony was that there
was absolutely no evidence that Shaughnessy wrote any of the ten
subscription forms he was charged with writing or that he wrote any of the
ten uncharged subscription forms, four of which Mr. Raichle attributed to
Shaughnessy. I further testified and demonstrated that four of the ten
charged forms were written by Patrick Duncan (who had already been
criminally convicted for his involvement), another two appeared to have
been written by Duncan, and the remaining four contained significant
similarities to the hand printing of Police Officer Garrett Morrison, and were,
beyond all doubt, not written by Shaughnessy.33

33
“Mr. Sulner, due to lack of sufficient available exemplars from Morrison, would not
positively identify Morrison as the author of these items. However, he did testify that due to
the number and probative weight to be assigned to the numerous similarities, any indication
of authorship is on Morrison. Shaughnessy, he testified, is, beyond all doubt, not the author.”
In re Guido v. Shaughnessy, 1983 Extra LEXIS 3, at *25 (citations omitted).
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The chart below indicates which of the salient features of the
questioned hand printing were found by Mr. Raichle to be similar or
dissimilar to the hand printing features of Shaughnessy (the only writer
whose hand printing he compared).
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The chart below reflects my findings regarding the distribution across
three writers (Shaughnessy, Morrisown and Duncan) of the same slient hand
printing features.

The results obtained from my examination of exemplar writings from
writers other than just the target (suspect) made it clear that more of the
salient features were found in the writings of Morrison and Duncan than in
Shaughnessy’s.34 This, coupled with my testimony as to the significant
34

The reader is referred to the decision In re Guido v. Shaughnessy, 1983 Extra LEXIS
3, (Westchester Cty., N.Y. Dep’t Pub. Safety Nov. 18, 1983), for a detailed analysis of the
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dissimilarities between Shaughnessy’s hand printing and the questioned
hand printing, is what enabled the trier of fact to reject the testimony of the
government’s expert and conclude:
I must concur with the findings of Mr. Sulner. Aside from the
similarities in the “L” in “Police,” there do not appear to be any
significant similarities in the questioned writings and those of P.O.
Shaughnessy. The numerous distinctions between the two (2) sets
of writings compel the conclusion that Shaughnessy was not the
author of the questioned writings.35

IV. LAWYERS AND JUDGES NEED TO BE MORE COGNIZANT OF THE
POTENTIAL IMPACT OF COGNITIVE BIAS ON THE OPINIONS AND
TESTIMONY OF FORENSIC HANDWRITING EXPERTS36
A. Sources of Cognitive Bias That Can Unduly Influence the
Outcome of Forensic Handwriting Examinations
Contextual bias is the most common form of cognitive bias encountered
in forensics. It occurs when potentially biasing background information that
is irrelevant to the discipline-specific task assigned to an examiner (e.g.,
examining and comparing handwriting) is conveyed to the examiner before
the examiner has completed the task and reached a conclusion. It is not
uncommon for forensic document examiners to be “briefed” about the
background of the case surrounding the document(s) being submitted to
them for forensic handwriting analysis.37 Such extraneous information
usually suggests the outcome preferred or desired by the party requesting the
analysis, and consequently, has the potential to unduly influence and distort
the examiner’s visual perception and evaluation of the handwriting evidence
submitted. In the law enforcement or criminal justice setting, potentially
biasing information usually concerns the crime itself, the criminal
background of the suspect, or knowledge of a confession or some other form
of physical or testimonial evidence linking the suspect to the crime.

handwriting evidence presented in this case, particularly with respect to the handwriting
features that the government’s handwriting expert mischaracterized as “significant”
similarities attributable to Shaughnessy.
35
In re Guido v. Shaughnessy, 1983 Extra LEXIS 3, at *47–48 (Westchester Cty., N.Y.
Dep’t Pub. Safety Nov. 18, 1983).
36
The material in Part IV originally appeared in Andrew Sulner, Handwriting: Cognitive
Bias, in WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 1–15 (Allan Jamieson & Andre
Moenssens eds., 2014).
37
Larry S. Miller, Bias Among Forensic Document Examiners: A Need For Procedural
Changes, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 407 (1984).
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The idea that document examiners should be insulated from all
information about an investigation except necessary, domain-specific
information is not novel. William E. Hagan’s 1894 treatise on the
examination of disputed handwriting and signatures contained the following
commentary highlighting the need to keep document examiners “blinded”
from such biasing influences:
[T]he examiner must depend wholly upon what is seen [in the
forensic examination], leaving out of consideration all suggestions
or hints from interested parties; and if possible it best subserves
the conditions of fair examination that the expert should not know
the interest which the party employing him to make the
examination has in the result. Where the expert has no knowledge
of the moral evidence or aspects of the case in which signatures
are a matter of contest, there is nothing to mislead him, or to
influence the forming of an opinion; and while knowing of the
case as presented by one side of the context might or might not
shade the opinion formulated, yet it is better that the latter be based
entirely on what the writing itself shows, and nothing else.38
Motivational bias on the part of forensic experts can be attributed to a
variety of factors, and research on motivated reasoning has shown that an
individual’s reasoning processes are more readily biased when the individual
is motivated by goals other than accuracy.39 Wharton provides the following
commentary regarding motivational bias on the part of handwriting experts:
It is well known that in cases of peculiar difficulty, when the
difference, if there be any, between two handwritings is only
noticeable by perceptions, the most sensitive experts, no matter
how conscientious, often take unconsciously such a bias from the
party employing them as to give to their judgment the almost
infinitely slight impulse that turns the scale; nor is it strange that,
in an instrument so delicate, aberrations from its true course
should be produced by attractions or repulsions otherwise
unappreciable. If an expert could be absolutely secluded from
such extraneous influences, his judgment might be depended on
at least for impartiality. This, however, is impracticable. A jury is
bound, therefore, to accept the opinion of an expert as to
handwriting, even when uncontradicted, as an argument rather
38
WILLIAM E. HAGAN, A TREATISE ON DISPUTED HANDWRITING AND THE
DETERMINATION OF GENUINE FROM FORGED SIGNATURES 82 (1894).
39
See DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 25
(2012) (citing Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULLETIN 480
(1990)).
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than a proof; and to make allowance for all the disturbing
influences by which the judgment of the expert may be moved. 40
Wharton’s view of when the judgments of handwriting experts are most
vulnerable to bias is confirmed by psychological research indicating that
forensic practitioners are less likely to be swayed by potentially biasing
influences when the evidence is clear-cut and unambiguous.41 Simply put, it
is far more difficult to rationalize a desired outcome in the face of very
strong, if not irrefutable, evidence to the contrary.
Contextual and motivational influences can produce confirmation bias,
the tendency to seek out and interpret evidence in ways that support or
confirm pre-existing beliefs and desires. Conflicts between truth-seeking
goals and outcome-oriented goals are often fueled by the adversarial nature
of the legal process itself.42 The 2009 NAS Report43 and research studies44
indicate that forensic practitioners assigned to evaluate evidence may be
motivated to see their side of a case prevail, which can lead them to endorse
a biased view of the evidence that is consistent with their adoption of an
adversarial, outcome-oriented role instead of an objective truth-seeking one.
Moreover, “tough-on-crime” attitudes prevalent within the law enforcement
community tend to foster confirmation biases that leave prosecutors,
investigators, and forensic specialists in crime laboratories more inclined to
prioritize the value of obtaining a conviction of the accused over the
countervailing priority of protecting the accused from a wrongful
conviction.45 These potentially biasing influences render handwriting and
40
FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES 711–
12 (3d ed. 1888).
41
See SIMON, supra note 39, at 25 (citing Karl Ask, Anna Rebelius & Pär Anders
Granhag, The “Elasticity” of Criminal Evidence: A Moderator of Investigative Bias, 22
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL., 1245 (2008); Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts
Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 600 (2006)).
42
See generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic
Competence, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1009 (2008).
43
NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 122–24 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/n
ij/grants/228091.pdf [hereinafter 2009 NAS REPORT].
44
See SIMON, supra note 39, at 26 (citing Dan Simon, Doug Stenstrom & Stephen J.
Read, On the Objectivity of Investigations: An Experiment (Aug. 18, 2008), https://papers.ssr
n.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130103).
45
See, e.g., Stephen B. Perrot & Donald M. Taylor, Attitudinal Differences Between
Police Constables and Their Supervisors: Potential Influences of Personality, Work
Environment, and Occupational Role, 22 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 326, 333–37 (1995)
(explaining that levels of authoritarianism views differ between constables and supervisors);
Richard K. Wortley & Ross J. Homel, Police Prejudice as a Function of Training and
Outgroup Contact: A Longitudinal Investigation, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1995)
(explaining that police prejudices vary according to policing experiences); Karl Ask & Pär
Anders Granhag, Motivational Sources of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations: The
Need for Cognitive Closure, 2 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 43 (2005).
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other forensic experts vulnerable to making erroneous decisions about the
evidence they evaluate.
Absent the implementation of practical bias minimizing procedures
when evidence is submitted to and evaluated by handwriting experts in civil
or criminal cases, it is unlikely to expect such experts to be kept “blinded”
from domain-irrelevant information or other potential biasing influences.
Some of the recommended changes that have been proposed for minimizing
bias in handwriting investigations are discussed below in Part V.C.
B. Observer Effects: How Examiner Bias Can Unduly Influence
Forensic Handwriting Expertise
Observer effects refer to the ways in which an examiner’s perception and
interpretation of evidence can be influenced by the examiner’s preconceived
beliefs and motives, or by the surrounding context, which can include
background information conveyed to the examiner as well as the evidence
itself, the latter being a phenomenon often overlooked. Examiner bias in
forensic handwriting investigations can influence how examinations and
comparisons are performed, the visual perceptions and observations of the
examiner, the findings and opinions drawn from evaluating and comparing
questioned and known writings, and the manner in which the examiner
testifies in court. Some of the mechanisms and mental processes by which
such cognitive bias can operate are discussed below.
1. Selective Exposure: Choosing Which Evidence to Examine
Observer effects refer to the ways in which an examiner’s perception and
interpretation of evidence can be influenced by the examiner’s preconceived
beliefs and motives, or by the surrounding context, which can include
background information conveyed to the examiner as well as the evidence
itself—the latter being a phenomenon often overlooked. Examiner bias in
forensic handwriting investigations can influence how examinations and
comparisons are performed, the visual perceptions and observations of the
examiner, the findings and opinions drawn from evaluating and comparing
questioned and known writings, and the manner in which the examiner
testifies in court. Some of the mechanisms and mental processes by which
such cognitive bias can operate are discussed below.
2. Selective Scrutiny: Selectively Evaluating Evidence in a
Manner That Favors a Particular Outcome
A handwriting expert’s selective scrutiny of evidence occurs when the
expert searches only for evidence that will confirm the expert’s favored
outcome. An example would be where a handwriting expert’s favored
outcome is common authorship and in the course of examining the evidence,
the expert’s attention is disproportionately focused on looking for
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similarities in writing features between the questioned and exemplar writing,
thereby failing to meaningfully search for or recognize the presence of
differences in writing features between the two sets of writings. As discussed
in Part IV.B.3, the Fischhof Method of upside-down writing comparison
developed by my grandfather in the early 1900s can help to minimize the
risk that differences between two sets of writings will be overlooked in cases
of particular difficulty or ambiguity.46
3. Overlooking Differences in Writing Features Due to
Observer Effects from the Evidence Itself (“Familiarity
Heuristic”)
Much of the literature in the emerging field of cognitive forensics has
focused on observer effects resulting from extraneous (domain-irrelevant)
contextual information, neglecting the effect the evidence itself can have on
the observer’s visual perceptions of that evidence. Although cognitive
psychologists have long been aware that familiarity can cause oversight of
unusual events or situations, this heuristic (which I have labeled the
“familiarity heuristic”) has been largely overlooked as a factor contributing
to observer effects in forensic handwriting examinations and comparisons.47
Julius Fischhof, a pioneer in the field of questioned documents and
Eastern Europe’s leading handwriting expert in the early twentieth century,48
recognized that in the context of text-based handwriting, the familiarity of
letters or words can unconsciously contribute to an examiner’s failure to
observe or recognize salient writing features, most notably differences
between two sets of text-based signatures or handwritten items that appear
to be very similar. Fischhof discovered that by comparing such questioned
and known signatures or handwriting upside down, the examiner is not
subconsciously influenced by reading individual letters or words and has a
more objective view of writing features.49 In essence, the Fischhof Method
46

The FBI Laboratory recently revised its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and
training materials for Examining Friction Ridge Impressions. “The training materials provide
techniques for avoiding bias, such as tracing the entire unknown print before looking at the
known, reconstructing the deposition pressure to ‘reverse engineer’ distortions, or turning the
print upside down or looking at it obliquely to get a different perspective.” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S PROGRESS IN RESPONDING TO THE
RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT ON THE FINGERPRINT
MISIDENTIFICATION IN THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 28 (June 2011),
https://oig.justice.gov/special/s1105.pdf (emphasis added).
47
D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 15
(2002) (“The flexibility of the human cognitive system permits us to ‘tune’ ourselves to
perceive some things and ignore other things, usually so automatically and seamlessly that we
rarely realize we are doing it. This tuning process results in ‘selective attention’ to
information.”).
48
See Thomas Jr., supra note 2.
49
JULIUS FISCHHOF, NEW METHOD OF COMPARING HANDWRITING (1927); HANNA F.
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of upside-down comparison offers the examiner a means of avoiding
undesirable observer effects from the very thing being observed—the
handwriting—by preventing the ocular distraction resulting from following
written characters or words readily familiar to the observer. It serves to
minimize the cognitive noise and interference resulting from the familiarity
heuristic associated with observations of text-based handwriting by altering
the handwritten image into something that is unrecognizable, thereby
tricking the brain into thinking it is seeing an unfamiliar image. By providing
a totally different visual perspective of the very same evidence, the Fischhof
Method affords FDEs the type of visual feedback that helps them avoid
overlooking differences in relevant writing features that might impact the
accuracy of their judgments about handwriting. It is akin to the professional
proofreader’s strategy of reading material backward when checking for
misspellings in order to avoid becoming distracted by content issues.
In In re Last, a 1989 New York State Surrogate Court decision involving
conflicting expert testimony about the validity of a signature appearing on a
shareholders agreement between two brothers,50 the Court commented
favorably on the Fischhof Method:
The petitioner’s expert, a well-known authority and author in the
field of handwriting analysis, concluded that the signature of
Walter Last on the shareholder’s agreement was a forgery. Her
testimony included a detailed analysis of the subject signature
with a comparison to known exemplars of the decedent’s
signature. She employed an “upside-down” technique in which a
known and a questioned signature are compared after they are
inverted. Since there is a natural tendency to read words instead
of noting variations in characters, this method allegedly gives the
examiner a truer basis for comparison. Employing photographic
enlargements of known signatures and the questioned signature,
and acknowledging that no two signatures of the same person are
exactly alike, she emphasized differences in both primary and
secondary characteristics and opined that the questioned signature
was not that of the decedent.
There was an attempt to show, both by testimony that the Last
brothers signed each other’s signature, and by noting certain
characteristics in Bert’s signature, that the questioned signature
“is more identical to the characteristics in Bert Last’s
handwriting . . . than with Walter Last’s signature.” The court,
after being advised that the petitioner did not intend to show that
SULNER, DISPUTED DOCUMENTS: NEW METHODS FOR EXAMINING QUESTIONED DOCUMENTS 48
(1966).
50
In re Last, No. 1983-1177, 1989 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 933 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Jan. 9, 1989).
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Bert had committed the forgery, ruled the testimony irrelevant and
barred further questioning along these lines.
The respondent countered with another expert, a trained examiner
of questioned documents. He described his method of examining
the questioned signature and comparing it with a series of known
signatures of the decedent. The expert considered such features
as skill, slant, speed, spacing proportions, relative size, and upper
case letter versus lower-case comparisons. Pen stops, hesitations,
tremors and possible tracing were also taken into account.
Pictorial aspects and design forms were reviewed, particularly as
they applied to variation (no two signatures of a person are exactly
alike). On the basis of these tests, this expert concluded that the
questioned signature is that of the decedent. When asked why the
questioned signature appeared to have a break between two letters,
he said the lack of a “connecting stroke” was insignificant,
attributing it to a normal variation. Under extensive crossexamination, he explained apparent inconsistencies in the
signatures, such as hooks, straight lines and spaces. He found all
fell within the parameters of variation contemplated in multiple,
one-author signatures.
The expert testimony offered by the petitioner, while lacking in
certain respects, was more convincing than that presented by the
respondent. The analysis conducted by the petitioner’s expert,
particularly the “upside-down” comparison, was credible and
persuasive. The explanation offered by the respondent’s expert
was insufficient to eliminate glaring differences between the
signatures, particularly as regards spacing. The normal variation
present in everyone’s signature does not account for the
divergence in primary characteristics, as cogently explained by
the petitioner’s expert.51
4. Selective Stopping (“Rush to Judgment” Mindset)
Selective stopping occurs when an investigation prematurely terminates
further inquiries after having found some evidence to support a favored
outcome, but before adequate consideration was given to alternative
hypotheses or the existence and availability of evidence tending to refute the
favored outcome. This “rush to judgment” mindset, a byproduct of
confirmation bias, has contributed to flawed FBI investigations in several
51

Id. at *5–7 (emphasis added).
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high-profile cases, such as the wrongful arrests and subsequent exonerations
of Richard Jewell in connection with the 1996 bombing of Atlanta’s
Centennial Olympic Park that killed 1 individual and injured 117 others,52
and Brandon Mayfield in connection with the 2004 Madrid train bombings
that killed 191 individuals and wounded 1,800.53
5. Selective Reevaluation of Evidence and/or Revision of
Findings
More often than not, domain-irrelevant background information about a
given case is conveyed to an examiner at the time the evidence is initially
submitted for analysis. Sometimes, the information is obtained afterward, as
when the examiner learns that his/her findings are inconsistent with test
results obtained from forensic analysis of other items of evidence in the case,
or from analysis of the very same evidence by a different analyst. Crosscommunication of findings from analysis of the same or other evidence can
unduly influence objectivity of handwriting experts, and it has been raised
as a possible source of error in many cases involving handwriting
identifications, especially where the disclosure of such information has
prompted the examiner to refine or change the initial conclusion after
“reevaluating” the very same evidence. In response to the 2009 NAS Report
and revelations that cognitive bias contributed to laboratory and practitioner
errors in some high-profile criminal cases,54 the FBI laboratory has
reportedly discontinued its long-standing practice of allowing forensic
examiners in one discipline unit to know the findings of forensic examiners
in another discipline unit and to confer with one another in the event of
conflicting results.
C. Recommendations (Proposed Solutions) for Minimizing Examiner
Bias in Forensic Handwriting Investigations
Forensic document examiners and others in the forensic science
community have historically dismissed cognitive bias as a factor
contributing to examiner errors in casework, insisting that such errors are
caused by incompetence or dishonesty rather than domain-irrelevant
52

See Luke Cyphers, Richard Jewell Keeps Being Remembered as a Suspect, Not the
Hero of the 1996 Atlanta Olympics Bombing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/seeking-bomb-shelter-article-1.891938.
53
See A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S PROGRESS, supra note 46. See also Robert B. Stacey,
Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case,
FBI LAB. SERVS. (Jan. 2005), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-sciencecommunications/fsc/jan2005/special_report/2005_special_report.htm; Steven T. Wax &
Christopher J. Schatz, A Multitude of Errors: The Brandon Mayfield Case, CHAMPION MAG.
(Sept./Oct. 2004). The facts of the case and Mayfield’s legal claims against the government
are fully reported in Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Or. 2007).
54
2009 NAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 122–24.
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contextual or motivational influences. Consequently, there has been a longstanding reluctance on the part of the forensic community at large to
acknowledge the need to develop internal procedures and strategies designed
to minimize the likelihood of having the objectivity of forensic decisionmaking compromised by potentially biasing influences. However, there now
exists a substantial body of empirical research reported in peer-reviewed
scientific and legal journals and to the forensic science community at large
that clearly establishes the susceptibility of handwriting, fingerprint, and
other pattern recognition experts to having the results of their examinations
and comparisons cognitively contaminated and unduly influenced by
domain-irrelevant contextual information and motivational bias.55 With
more and more stakeholders recognizing and understanding the insidious
manner in which cognitive contaminants can be toxic to one’s neutrality,
proposals and recommendations for minimizing examiner bias are now
receiving considerably more attention within the forensic science, legal, and
academic communities, as reflected in some of the more recent peer55
See, e.g., Keith Inman & Norah Rudin, Sequential Unmasking: Minimizing Observer
Effects in Forensic Science, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 542–48 (Jay A. Siegel
& Pekka J. Saukko eds., 2d ed. 2013); SIMON, supra note 39; Sulner, Handwriting: Cognitive
Bias, supra note 36; David Canter et al., Cognitive Bias in Line-up Identifications: The Impact
of Administrative Knowledge, 53 SCI. & JUST. 83 (2013); Simon A. Cole, Implementing
Counter-Measures Against Confirmation Bias in Forensic Science, 2 J. APPLIED RES.
MEMORY & COGNITION 61 (2013); Itiel E. Dror, Cognitive Forensics and Experimental
Research about Bias in Forensic Casework, 52 SCI. & JUST. 128 (2012); Itiel E. Dror et al.,
New Application of Psychology to Law: Improving Forensic Evidence and Expert Witness
Contributions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 78 (2013); Itiel E. Dror, Practical
Solutions to Cognitive and Human Factor Challenges in Forensic Science, 4 FORENSIC SCI.
POL’Y & MGMT 105 (2013); Bryan Found & John Ganas, The Management of Domain
Irrelevant Context Information in Forensic Handwriting Examination Casework, 53 SCI. &
JUST. 154 (2013); Saul M. Kassin, Why Confessions Trump Innocence, 67 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
431, 433–34 (2012); Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems,
Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 42 (2013);
Dan E. Krane et al., Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in
Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006 (2008); Jeff Kukucka & Saul M.
Kassin, Do Confessions Taint Perceptions of Handwriting Evidence? An Empirical Test of
the Forensic Confirmation Bias, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2013); Risinger, Saks, Thompson
& Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 1; Reinoud D. Stoel, Itiel E. Dror, & Larry S. Miller, Bias
Among Forensic Document Examiners: Still a Need for Procedural Changes, 46 AUSTRALIAN
J. FORENSIC SCIS. 91 (2014); D. Michael Risinger, How to Undermine Proffered Expert
Opinion Infected with the Precursors of Bias, Speech at the 66th Annual Meeting of the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 17, 2014); Andrew Sulner, Chair, Bias in
Forensics Workshop, & Barry Scheck, Co-Chair, Bias in Forensics Workshop, Examining the
Sources and Impacts of Bias on Perceptual and Cognitive Judgments Made by Forensic
Experts, Strategies for Excluding or Impeaching Expert Testimony Tainted by Bias, and
Proposed Solutions for Minimizing or Inhibiting Biasing Influences, Speeches at the 66th
Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 17, 2014); Andrew
Sulner, Examining Sources of Bias and Illustrating Their Impact on Handwriting Opinions
and Testimony of Forensic Document Examiners, Speech at the 66th Annual Meeting of the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 17, 2014).
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reviewed publications and presentations addressing this topic.56
Unfortunately, the FDE community has been slow in incorporating bias
control measures into existing standards governing best practices for
performing handwriting examinations.
In the case of forensic handwriting investigations, virtually all
procedures and strategies that can be used to minimize examiner bias involve
either implementing examiner debiasing techniques or restructuring
institutional context management and evidence testing protocols, as briefly
summarized below.
1. Considering the “Oppositional Hypothesis” First
As domain-irrelevant information invariably enters the scene through the
mouths of lawyers or clients intent on convincing the handwriting expert of
the merits of their claim(s), healthy skepticism on the part of the expert goes
a long way toward ensuring neutrality in the analysis and evaluation of
handwriting evidence. In considering the oppositional hypothesis first, an
examiner approaches the investigation with the mindset of having been hired
by the adverse or oppositional party. In this way, the examiner is forced to
consider the least favored hypothesis first and elaborate on the reasons for

56

Id. See also e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Bias Control: The National Commission on
Forensic Science, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Draft
Guidance on Cognitive Bias Effects from the Forensic Science Regulator for England and
Wales, Speech at the 67th Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences
(AAFS) (Feb. 17, 2015); Andrew Sulner et al., Human Factors in Forensic Science: Why
Cognitive Bias Can Lead to Flawed Expert Opinions and Testimony, How Its Influence Can
Be Minimized, and What Challenges Testifying Experts and Judges Can Expect to Face at
the Plenary Session, Speeches at the 67th Annual Meeting of the AAFS (Feb. 18, 2015). All
speaker presentations are viewable on YouTube. See Dan Simon, Cognitive and Motivational
Causes of Investigative Error, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watc
h?v=46mS8gvAYMU&feature=youtu.be; William C. Thompson, Are Good Intentions and
Willpower Sufficient to Overcome Contextual Bias? A Look at the Psychological Literature,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bzXft_13Ass&feature=y
outu.be; Saul Kassin, Confessions in Context: Why Confessions Corrupt Forensic Perceptions
and Judgments, YOUTUBE (Apr. 24, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
hC7EBZCnWNs&feature=youtu.be; Andrew Sulner, Why Forensic Scientists Should
Embrace the Concept of Bias Control: A Practitioner’s Perspective, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzH2tNVdqfw&feature=youtu.be;
Barry
Scheck, Beginning A Dialogue: Human Factors and Forensic Pathology, YOUTUBE (Apr. 22,
2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cjbkVUlDOs&feature=youtu.be;
Andrew
Baker, History, Cognitive Bias, Incompetence, and Corruption Are Not the Same Thing,
YOUTUBE (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiePh1COEYE&featu
re=youtu.be; Andrew Sulner, Bias Effects in Forensic Handwriting Investigations and Expert
Testimony: An Insider’s View, Speech at the 67th Annual Meeting of the AAFS (Feb. 17,
2015); Andrew Sulner, Chair, Bias in Forensics Workshop, & Barry Scheck, Co-Chair, Bias
in Forensics Workshop, Cognitive Bias Issues in the Forensic Analysis of Pattern and
Impression Evidence and in Medicolegal Evaluations, Speeches at the 67th Annual Meeting
of the AAFS (Feb. 17, 2015).
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Only then does the examiner consider the most favored

2. Considering Alternative Possibilities and Hypotheses
(Playing the Role of “Devil’s Advocate”)
Considering all plausible alternative possibilities before deciding on a
particular one is essential to the integrity of any type of investigation.
Promoting a “devil’s advocate” mindset in which thinking “outside the box”
is encouraged should therefore be prioritized in the training and continuing
education of all forensic experts, as contrarian and critical thinking skills are
needed in order to be able to both generate and properly evaluate plausible
alternative hypotheses. This is particularly important in the case of
handwriting, as its physical appearance can be significantly affected by a
variety of environmental and motivational factors (for example, awkward
writing position, the influence of drug or alcohol intoxication/withdrawal,
the import of the document itself, and deliberate attempt at disguise).
It has also been suggested that examiners should not be allowed to
summarily dismiss alternative possibilities and hypotheses, and that any
refutations should be accompanied by documentation describing in detail the
reasons for rejecting each alternative possibility.
3. Using the Fischhof Method to Compare Text-Based
Writings That Appear Very Similar and as a “Self-Review”
of One’s Initial Observations
The Fischhof Method of upside-down comparison described earlier in
this Article can be used as a possible safeguard against overlooking
differences in salient writing features whenever a handwriting expert is
confronted with two sets of text-based writings that appear quite similar. This
method of comparison can also afford an examiner a “fresh new look” at the
evidence, enabling observations from the initial analysis to be measured
against observations derived from inverted image comparisons of the very
same evidence. Optimally, such a self-conducted review should take place at
a time well after the initial handwriting analysis so as to reduce the likelihood
of any “interference” produced by recall of observations made during the
initial analysis.
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4. Using Institutional Debiasing Techniques: Context
Management Protocols and Procedures
i. Separating the Crime Laboratory or Evidence Analysis
Function from the Police and Prosecutorial Functions
The 2009 NAS Report recommended separating the crime laboratory
function from any law enforcement department or agency, theorizing that a
truly autonomous crime laboratory would mitigate, if not remove, the
institutional pressures placed on crime laboratory analysts to produce results
that favor the police or prosecution’s theory of the case, and would foster a
more neutral mindset that prioritizes the truth-seeking goal.57 To date, little
headway has been made in implementing this concept due to practical and
economic considerations, as well as institutional resistance to change.
ii. Using Sequential Unmasking Procedures and Case
Managers
Context management protocols involve shielding the examiner from
domain-irrelevant information and employing “sequential unmasking”
procedures to control the order in which domain-relevant but potentially
biasing information is “unmasked” and disclosed to the examiner. Ideally,
the examiner is kept as blind as possible for as long as possible, and remains
unaware of domain irrelevant information until all examinations and tests are
completed.
Optimally, a case manager who is privy to all the facts of the case is
responsible for determining which evidence to test, and for evaluating and
interpreting the test results in the context of the case in order to assess
whether the test results support an inculpatory or exculpatory hypothesis.
The case manager should also possess, or have access to, relevant subject
matter expertise, as difficult decisions may need to be made about what
information is domain-relevant and when and how such information should
be obtained and disclosed to the examiner.
The strict protocol for sequential unmasking requires that after looking
at the questioned item(s) and before looking at any exemplar(s), the examiner
must determine (and make a written record of) the specific distinguishing
features that the examiner would rely on in deciding whether to associate or
disassociate the questioned item(s) with the exemplar(s).58 This procedural
57

See 2009 NAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 23–24 (“Recommendation 4: To improve the
scientific bases of forensic science examinations and to maximize independence from or
autonomy within the law enforcement community, Congress should authorize and appropriate
incentive funds to the National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS) for allocation to state and
local jurisdictions for the purpose of removing all public forensic laboratories and facilities
from the administrative control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’ offices.”)
58
See Inman & Rudin, supra note 55, at 544–45; Krane, supra note 55, at 1006; Risinger,
Saks, Thompson & Rosenthal, supra note 1; William C. Thompson, Painting the Target
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requirement is deemed a necessary safeguard against target-shifting, in
which knowledge about features contained in the exemplar(s) influences the
examiner’s interpretation of the questioned item(s) and the examiner’s
decision about which features are relevant and irrelevant for comparison
purposes.59
Although sequential unmasking procedures can be implemented with
relative ease, most, if not all, forensic laboratories in the United States have
not done so for handwriting investigations. This may be due to the fact that
the method by which a handwriting expert selects the salient writing features
to be used for comparison purposes is subjective and examiner-dependent,
there being no standardized best-practice protocol for how such feature
selection should be made, let alone documented.
The Document
Examination Unit of the Victoria Police Forensic Services Department in
Australia, however, most recently embarked on a pilot study using a
modified version of the sequential unmasking protocol for handwriting
cases.60
iii. Using Exemplar (Evidence) Lineups and Blind Evidence
Submission Protocols
In investigations seeking to determine whether a handwritten item can
be attributed to a particular source writer, the FDE is often presented with
the questioned item(s) and only the suspected (targeted) writer’s reference
item(s), such as handwriting exemplars. Some commentators from the legal
and scientific communities have criticized the suggestiveness inherent in
such a procedure, arguing that exemplar lineups should be used for
handwriting identifications and other types of evidential source attributions
in much the same way that photo lineups are used for eyewitness
identifications.61 As the same deficiencies that make a photo lineup unduly
suggestive make an exemplar lineup unduly suggestive, both types of lineups
require presenting similar-looking “fillers” (“foils”) to the observer (the
handwriting expert or the eyewitness). Thus, in blind exemplar lineups, the
examiner would receive the handwritten item(s) in question along with an
array of similar-looking handwriting exemplars from a group of anonymous

Around the Matching Profile: The Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy in Forensic DNA
Interpretation, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 257, 274.
59
See, e.g., Inman & Rudin, supra note 55, at 542–48; Krane, supra note 55, at 1006; D.
Michael Risinger, The Need for Sequential Unmasking—With Some Thoughts on How to
Undermine Proffered Expert Testimony Infected with the Precursors of Bias, Speech at the
66th Annual Meeting of the AAFS (Feb. 17, 2014).
60
See Found, supra note 55, at 154–58, for a detailed description of the Australian
protocol and how their sequential unmasking procedures were modified so that only the
essential information required for performing the requisite handwriting examinations and
comparisons is available to the examiner.
61
Id.
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individuals, including the suspected writer, and the examiner would receive
no information or cognitive cues that might unduly influence the examiner
to reach a particular outcome. To ensure that the analyst receives no
improper cues from the person(s) tasked with submitting the evidence to be
analyzed, it has been suggested that exemplar lineups be double-blind,
meaning that both the analyst and the individual(s) submitting the evidence
or arranging the exemplar lineup(s) not know the identity of the suspect or
the preferred outcome.62
In theory, every forensic pattern recognition discipline that requires
comparisons between unknown (questioned) items and known reference
items (exemplars) in order to determine the source of the unknown item(s)
can benefit from the use of exemplar lineups, as the presence of a large
number of “fillers” resembling the questioned item would arguably enhance
the reliability of any ensuing identification or source attribution. In practice,
however, obtaining handwriting “fillers” sufficiently similar to the
questioned writing is far more difficult than obtaining suitable “fillers” for
photo lineups, and such exemplar lineups may be of little usefulness in
instances where the questioned writing displays several highly distinctive,
individualizing writing features. In addition, double-blind lineups would
seem to be far more feasible in handwriting investigations undertaken by
public sector or institutional forensic laboratories where examiners can work
with case managers possessing discipline-specific (handwriting) expertise
and “blind” evidence lineup administrators than by private sector examiners
who work as solo practitioners and receive their casework assignments
directly from lawyers or clients, oftentimes accompanied by cues that
indicate the desired outcome.
The use of single-blind exemplar lineups in handwriting cases is not a
new development. For example, in investigating the source of anonymous
handwritten letters emanating from a limited population of possible writers,
experienced forensic document examiners routinely insist on using exemplar
lineups and being kept blinded to which of the exemplars belongs to the
suspected writer until such time as the examiner has completed all
examinations and reached a decision.63 However, the usefulness of such
62

See Canter, supra note 55, at 83–88.
The failure to use exemplar lineups may also have contributed to the erroneous
handwriting opinions offered in nineteenth-century France’s infamous Dreyfus Affair.
Nearly a century later, France is once again confronted with the exemplar lineup issue in a
murder case known as the “Gregory Affair.” The case involves the October 1984 kidnapping
of four-year-old Gregory Villemin and a series of anonymous handwritten poison-pen letters
that were sent to his family. After the boy’s body was discovered, a witness incriminated an
uncle, who was indicted after a handwriting expert identified him as the author of the
anonymous notes. The witness later recanted, but not before Gregory’s father killed the uncle
to avenge his son’s murder. In a subsequent blind exemplar lineup procedure in which
handwriting exemplars from all members of the family were examined and compared to the
anonymous notes by a second expert, Gregory’s mother, Christine, was identified as the
63
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lineups varies inversely with the distinctiveness of the handwriting features
observed in the questioned writing(s); that is, the more distinctive the writing
features in the questioned item, the more difficult it will be to find similarlooking “fillers,” and hence, the less useful the “fillers” will be.
Single-blind exemplar lineups prevent the handwriting expert from
knowing the favored outcome because even if the expert has been exposed
to other domain-irrelevant information, the expert would still not know
which of the exemplars came from the suspected writer. Throughout my
career, I have always preferred and made every reasonable effort to use
single-blind exemplars in source attribution investigations, and I have
publicly advocated for the routine use of single-blind exemplars in all source
attribution handwriting investigations.64

author, and she was indicted. Christine served almost eight years in prison for Gregory’s
murder before being cleared on appeal. See Richard Bernstein, All of France is Asking: Who
Killed Petit Gregory?, N.Y. TIMES, (July 16, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/07/16/
world/all-of-france-is-asking-who-killed-petit-gregory.html; see also INT’L HERALD TRIB.,
July 18, 1985, at 2, col. 3. In 2008, an appellate court ordered the case to be reopened in the
hope that new advances in forensic science could shed light on DNA evidence. France still
awaits the final chapter of this unsolved murder mystery that has seen two defendants indicted
for the same murder on the basis of being identified by two different handwriting experts as
the sole author of the anonymous notes.
64
Andrew Sulner, Why Forensic Scientists Should Embrace the Concept of Bias
Control: A Practitioner’s Perspective, Speech at 67th Annual Meeting of the AAFS (Feb. 18,
2015) (video of speech viewable at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QzH2tNVdqfw&feat
ure=youtu.be); see also Sulner, Handwriting: Cognitive Bias, supra note 36.
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V. CASEWORK PEER REVIEWS: THE NEED TO KNOW WHAT THEY
ARE AND AREN’T AND WHY DIRECT TESTIMONY ABOUT ANY
REVIEW PERFORMED BY A NON-TESTIFYING EXPERT IS
INADMISSIBLE AS A MATTER OF LAW

A. Types of Casework Peer Reviews
There are three types of casework peer reviews that can be performed:
(1) administrative reviews, (2) technical reviews, and (3) verifications.65
1. Administrative Review
An administrative review involves a procedure used to check case file
documentation and case reports for consistency with laboratory policy and
for editorial correctness.66 Essentially, it checks that the final report is
coherent, reflects the examinations performed, and is free of spelling and
grammar errors. It is acceptable for administrative reviews to be undertaken
by someone without expertise in the relevant subject matter, i.e., forensic
document examination.
2. Technical Review
A technical review involves a review of notes, data and other
supporting documents that form the basis for a scientific conclusion to ensure
that proper protocols and standards have been followed and that the case
(bench) notes and any diagrams support the conclusion reported.67 This type
of review does not involve a full reexamination of the actual evidence; it
simply checks that the correct and appropriate procedures have been
followed and documented by the examiner, that the conclusions reached by
the examiner are supported by the observations/results documented in the
case file, and that any limitations with respect to the findings have been
recorded and included in the report. Technical reviews must therefore be
carried out by someone who is qualified in the relevant discipline, i.e.,
another FDE.68
65
Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, Latent Print
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice Through a Systems Approach,
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. & NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. 184 (Feb. 2012),
http://ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=910745 [hereinafter 2012 NIST
LATENT PRINT REPORT]. See also AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. & LAB. ACCREDITATION
BD., ASCLD/LAB-INTERNATIONAL SUPPLEMENTAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ACCREDITATION
OF FORENSIC SCIENCE TESTING LABORATORIES (2011), http://des.wa.gov/sites/default/files/
public/documents/About/1063/RFP/Add7_Item4ASCLD.pdf; Scientific Working Grp. on
Friction Ridge Analysis, Study & Tech., Quality Assurance Guidelines for Latent Print
Examiners: Version 4.0, (Sept. 2006), http://clpex.com/swgfast/documents/qualityassurance/100210_Quality-Assurance_4.0.pdf.
66
2012 NIST LATENT PRINT REPORT, supra note 65, at 184.
67
Id.
68
Id. However, laboratory accreditation standards may not require that the individual
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A blind technical review is one in which the reviewer has no knowledge
of the examiner’s conclusion prior to forming his own opinion, which is
based solely on the case file documentation;69 however, the reviewer may or
may not have been blinded to domain-irrelevant case information.
3. Verification
This is a review procedure in which a second examiner independently
examines all the evidence examined by the first examiner and reaches his or
her own conclusion. A blind verification is a full-fledged reexamination of
the same evidence by another expert who is blinded from domain-irrelevant
context information and is unaware of the original examiner’s conclusion.70
A double-blind71 verification refers to a verification in which the reviewer
does not know the identity of the initial examiner and vice versa.72
Government forensic handwriting laboratories frequently perform
administrative and technical reviews as part of one review process, using a
checklist or worksheet that identifies the elements of the review process. An
example of an actual worksheet (redacted) used by a state crime laboratory
appears on the next page:

conducting the technical review be an active forensic document examiner or currently be
proficiency tested. See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. & LAB. ACCREDITATION BD.,
supra note 65.
69
2012 NIST LATENT PRINT REPORT, supra note 65, at 105.
70
See Canter, supra note 55, at 87; Inman, supra note 55, at 542.
71
“[A]n experimental procedure in which neither the subjects nor the experimenters
know the make-up of the tests and control groups.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 74a (1993).
72
Id.
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B. To Verify or Not to Verify?—Should the “V” in “ACE-V” Be a
Prerequisite to the Admissibility of Handwriting Identification
Opinion Evidence?
“ACE-V” is the acronym used to describe a four-step process used in the
forensic analysis of handwriting and other types of pattern evidence, most
notably fingerprints; it stands for Analyze, Compare, Evaluate, and Verify.73
“‘[M]any sources have described the verification phase of the ACE-V
process to be a repeat of the ACE process done by another examiner,’ while
‘[o]ther sources describe verification as a confirmation of the original
examiner’s conclusion.’”74 Essentially, the “V” in “ACE-V” is the
verification type of casework peer review defined above—a full and
complete reexamination of the evidence by a second examiner that results in
an independent verification of the first examiner’s reported findings and
opinion.
Although the independent verification step of the ACE-V methodology
is not a formal requirement for handwriting analysis, there are differing
views as to whether it should be a prerequisite to the admissibility of
handwriting identification opinion evidence. As both a practitioner of the
discipline and a lawyer, my views on this subject necessarily consider both
the practical and legal implications of mandating verification.
Most recently, this issue came to the forefront in two federal court cases,
Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting75 and Crew Tile Distrib., Inc.
v. Porcelanosa Los Angeles, Inc.76 Both cases involved the same putative
handwriting expert, Wendy Carlson, and the same task, evaluating the
authenticity of a contested signature.77 In both cases, motions were filed to
73

See United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 2009).
Crew Tile Distribution, Inc. v. Porcelanosa L.A., Inc., No. 13-cv-3206, 2016 WL
8608447, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2016) (quoting Michele Triplett & Lauren Cooney, The
Etiology of ACE-V and Its Proper Use: An Exploration of the Relationship Between ACE-V
and the Scientific Method of Hypothesis Testing, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 345 (2006)).
75
Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y.
2016).
76
Crew Tile Distribution, 2016 WL 8608447.
77
Ms. Carlson is not board certified by either the ABFDE or the BFDE, but her
Curriculum Vitae included in an August 16, 2016 Expert Report she submitted in a New
Jersey case (on file with the author) lists her as a “Certified Forensic Document Examiner and
Registered Investigator,” and claims that “[i]n the last seven years, [she] has examined more
than 10,000 documents and rendered opinions in approximately 1,000 active cases and
multiple peer reviews involving questioned signatures, altered documents, handwritings, legal
contracts, court documents, anonymous writing, and graffiti.” As noted in Almeciga and Crew
Tile, her apprenticeship training took the form of a two-year part-time internet course which
involved about five to ten hours of work per week under the tutelage of a mentor she met with
personally when they were “able to connect.” The course was offered through the
International School of Forensic Document Examination, an unaccredited school run by Bart
Baggett, possibly with involvement by his father, Curtis Leo Baggett, that offers a
“certification” upon completion of the course. Carlson’s CV also claims she obtained
74
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exclude Ms. Carlson’s testimony and opinions in their entirety, alleging,
inter alia, that Carlson’s failure to perform the verification step of ACE-V
rendered her methodology critically flawed and her opinion consequently
unreliable and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
In Almeciga, U.S. District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern
District of New York excluded Carlson’s testimony, finding her
“methodology [was] fundamentally unreliable and critically flawed,” in part,
because she failed to perform the verification step of the ACE-V process that
she claimed to have followed. Judge Rakoff stated,
while Carlson purported to apply the ACE-V method in her expert
report, . . . she admitted at the Daubert hearing that she did not
have time to obtain a verification of her opinion in this case and
that her report was inaccurate in this respect. Virtually by
definition, then, Carlson failed to “reliably appl[y] the principles
and methods” in question “to the facts of this case.”78
Judge Rakoff did not elaborate on why or whether he considers the lack
of verification, in and of itself, to be such a critical flaw that it, alone, can be
the death knell to admissibility, although some may take his decision to
imply just that. Given the case-specific facts of Almeciga, and the counterintuitiveness of assigning such critical importance to independent
verification of an expert’s opinion, I am inclined to believe that the lack of
verification mentioned by Judge Rakoff was meant to highlight one of
several striking contradictions between Carlson’s reports and her in-court
testimony, rather than to declare verification a sine qua non to a reliable
handwriting identification opinion.
In Crew Tile Distribution, decided four months after Almeciga, U.S.
District Court Judge William J. Martínez of the District of Colorado denied
Plaintiff’s Federal Rule of Evidence 702 motion to exclude Carlson’s
testimony.79 In rejecting Plaintiff’s argument that Carlson’s failure to
complete the verification step of ACE-V renders her opinions unreliable and
inadmissible, Judge Martinez concluded that although the lack of
verification is concerning, it does not render Carlson’s testimony
“certifications” from the American College of Forensic Examiners for completion of their
Registered Investigator course, Crime Scene Investigation course, and Digital Forensics
Introduction course. For information on the American College of Forensic Examiners and
the demise of its founder, see Radley Balko, The Emperor of Junk Science Forensics Has
Died, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thewatch/wp/2017/08/31/the-emperor-of-junk-science-forensics-has-died/?utm_term=.402e4d5
c0e69.
78
Judge Rakoff did, however, note that “[i]n her Supplemental Expert Report, Carlson
entirely drops the ‘verification’ step from her methodology, and purports to apply the ‘ACE’
methodology.” Almeciga, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 426 n.14 (citations omitted).
79
Crew Tile Distribution, 2016 WL 8608447, at *13.
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inadmissible. The following excerpts reflect a well-reasoned judicial
perspective with respect to the importance of verification in evaluating the
reliability of handwriting identification opinions:
Plaintiff contends that Ms. Carlson’s failure to complete the
verification step renders her opinions unreliable and inadmissible.
Plaintiff relies on United States v. McDaniels. There, the court
concluded that the proponent of the evidence had not provided
“clear evidence that [the expert] actually complied with steps 2–4
of this [ACE–V] methodology in the preparation of her expert
report and testimony,” and therefore struck the testimony for lack
of a sufficient showing of reliability. McDaniels is not on all fours
with the facts here, where Ms. Carlson completed the “ACE”
steps, but not verification.
In performing the Court’s gatekeeping function, “testing” and
“peer review” are only two of the illustrative factors articulated in
Daubert, and “independent testing is not the sine qua non of
admissibility under Daubert.” Moreover, “some of the Daubert
factors may be less helpful when the evidence under consideration
is not scientific in the strict sense.” The gatekeeping function
should be flexible, and “the relevant reliability concerns may focus
upon personal knowledge or experience.” Further, the Tenth
Circuit, has criticized the verification step of ACE-V analysis as
“not truly independent,” suggesting that such verification adds
little to reliability, but nevertheless finding expert testimony based
on ACE-V protocols admissible.
Given these considerations, while the lack of verification is
concerning, the Court concludes that it bears on the weight and
credibility of Ms. Carlson’s testimony. It does not render the
testimony inadmissible. The Court’s role as gatekeeper is not to
determine whether the opinion is correct, only that the method was
reliable enough to be presented to the jury. As described in the
materials submitted by Plaintiff, the role of verification in this
context is primarily to make the expert’s work “reviewable,” even
if it was not actually reviewed. Plaintiff does not argue that Ms.
Carlson’s work is not “reviewable,” nor that an expert of Plaintiff’s
choosing could not have reviewed and critiqued the analysis based
on the work shown in her report and supporting materials.
Moreover, as a practical matter, making the verification step of
ACE-V a prerequisite in every case would essentially require
parties to obtain two experts’ opinions before the first became
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admissible. And while verification might cause an examiner to
revisit her approach, it does not directly alter the examination and
review completed under the first three steps of ACE-V. The Court
is therefore not persuaded that obtaining verification was a
prerequisite to admissibility in this case. The Court therefore
agrees with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in Crisp, that to the
extent Ms. Carlson’s analysis is “flawed or flimsy,” including for
lack of verification, “an able . . . lawyer will bring that fact to the
jury’s attention,” and the jury will be “left to examine the
[Agreement] and decide for itself whether it agree[s] with the
expert.”80
The different perspectives of Judges Rakoff and Martinez probably have
more to do with the specific facts that came to light in the respective Daubert
hearings, rather than a fundamental difference of opinion as to how Rule 702
should be applied. However, this is an issue that requires an in-depth
analysis of the respective facts of each case, something that is beyond the
scope of this Article.81 In any event, I believe this issue is somewhat of a
“red herring” and moot because it is now settled law that verification of a
testifying expert’s opinion by a non-testifying expert may not be brought up
in the direct examination of the testifying expert,82 as discussed below.
C. Testimony About Peer Review(s) Performed by a Non-Testifying
Expert Constitutes Improper Bolstering and/or Inadmissible
Hearsay
FDEs, as well as expert witnesses from other forensic science
disciplines, have often testified that their casework is subjected to so-called
“peer review.” The proponent of such testimony seeks its admission to
demonstrate the quality assurance protocol employed in the testifying
expert’s forensic laboratory prior to the issuance of a final report.83
However, implicit in any such proffer is the notion that the peer review
process enhances the reliability of the proffered opinion evidence. The
typical line of inquiry posed to the testifying expert might be:
80

Crew Tile Distribution, 2016 WL 8608447, at *4–5 (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, in Part VI of this Article, infra, I have provided some limited, casespecific analysis with respect to a critical issue in that case—the impropriety and unreliability
of Ms. Carlson’s exclusive reliance on self-serving post litem motem exemplars in concluding
that the contested signature was a forgery, especially in the face of facts strongly suggesting
that the disclaiming signatory had provided Ms. Carlson with disguised exemplars.
82
However, the testifying expert may not be precluded from mentioning it in response
to a question posed on cross-examination that asks if his or her work was subjected to any
kind of “peer” review by another examiner.
83
Casework reviews are designed to address quality of output and human factors issues,
which can result in nonconformity with laboratory procedures and documentation
requirements, and errors in report writing and testimony.
81
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Was your work peer reviewed by anyone else?

A:
Yes. Our lab has 100% peer review, both technically and
administratively, by colleagues within the same section. Every
case worked on by one examiner is reviewed by another, and if
there is any disagreement between the two, a report does not leave
the lab.
Lawyers and trial judges mistakenly assume that the mere mention of the
words “peer review” equates to a comprehensive reexamination of the
evidence and an independent verification of a given opinion or conclusion.
This is because they are unaware of the different types of reviews and which
of them is or is not routinely performed.84 Unless one knows what a technical
or administrative review really entails, the above answer is misleading and
disingenuous. The above answer clearly implies that before finalizing any
report or conclusion, a “second set of eyes” reviewed the very same evidence
and came to the same conclusion as the testifying expert, which can only
occur with a verification type of review.
Trial judges have routinely allowed this type of testimony and appellate
courts have typically found that any error in doing so was harmless85—until
recently.86 Some lawyers have attempted to challenge such testimony by
84
A technical review is sometimes referred to as peer review in government forensic
laboratory settings. The term “peer review” is more widely used to describe the process of
reviewing manuscripts submitted for publication to a scientific journal, which is customarily
double-blind.
85
Bunche v. State, 5 So. 3d 38, 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). See id. (determining error
was harmless when fingerprint handwriting expert testified that a non-testifying expert
verified his work); State v. Jones, 368 S.E.2d 844, 846–49 (N.C. 1988) (finding trial court
properly permitted a fingerprint expert to testify that another expert had checked and
concurred with the testifying expert’s conclusion, because under the standard procedures
followed by the expert he could not have arrived at and testified to his opinion without the
verification by the other expert); State v. Williams, No. 95CA93, 1996 WL 753216, at *10
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) (permitting fingerprint expert’s testimony that he had his results
verified by another fingerprint expert).
86
See Miller v. State, 127 So. 3d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (determining error was
harmful when handwriting expert testified that non-testifying expert also determined
handwriting belonged to defendant). See also Potts v. State, 57 So. 3d 292, 294 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011) (determining error was harmful when fingerprint analyst testified that another
fingerprint expert determined fingerprints belonged to defendant); Telfort v. State, 978 So. 2d
225, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that the trial court committed reversible error by
allowing a fingerprint expert to testify that his identification of the defendant’s fingerprint
was verified by two other examiners); State v. Smith, 628 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994) (finding fingerprint technician’s testimony that her identification was verified by
another technician was hearsay); State v. Connor, 937 A.2d 928, 930–32 (N.H. 2007) (finding
fingerprint expert’s testimony regarding another expert’s verification inadmissible, because
the verification did not form a basis for the testifying expert’s opinion, but was simply a
necessary prerequisite to the release of his already formed opinion); State v. Wicker, 832 P.2d
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establishing that the casework peer review was biased and unreliable because
it was not performed blindly, e.g., the reviewer was a “friendly” colleague
or coworker, working in the very same laboratory unit or office. In the past,
I have publicly advocated that lawyers should instead seek to exclude such
testimony altogether because it constitutes improper bolstering or
inadmissible hearsay, or both,87 an argument that has found judicial
acceptance of late.88 Accordingly, lawyers, judges, and testifying experts
need to know the impact of recent court rulings declaring that testimony
about case review performed by non-testifying experts is inadmissible on
evidentiary grounds.
Before addressing the cases, I must first confess that my previous
approach (and that of many lawyers and courts) was too narrow in that it
failed to sufficiently emphasize the distinction between bolstering and
hearsay. “Bolstering” refers to the proffer of information for the sole
purpose of raising the credit the jury might give to a witness’s evidence
before the witness’s credibility has been attacked in any way on cross
examination or otherwise.89 The most common example of bolstering
evidence is evidence of a prior consistent statement to rebut a charge of
recent fabrication.90 Such evidence is not admissible unless and until there
is some suggestion by the opponent on cross-examination or otherwise that
a witness’s testimony on direct is a recent fabrication.91 Then evidence of
prior consistent statements by the witness that occurred before the suggested
impetus to falsify are admissible to rehabilitate the witness. Traditionally,
there was no hearsay exception for such prior consistent statements, but they
127, 128–30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (finding fingerprint expert’s testimony that his
identification was verified by another technician was inadmissible hearsay).
87
Andrew Sulner, Impeaching Self-Serving Case Review Evidence and Excluding Case
Review Testimony by a Second Forensic Document Examiner, Speech at the Annual
Symposium of the Association of Forensic Document Examiners (Nov. 6, 2009); Andrew
Sulner, Disingenuous Testimony About Casework Peer Review: Understanding What it
Really Means and When Such Testimony Will Be Precluded, Speech at the 64th Annual
Meeting of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 21, 2012); Andrew Sulner,
Legal Update: Recent Court Decisions Declaring Testimony About Case Reviews Performed
by Non-Testifying Experts to be Inadmissible, Speech at the 67th Annual Meeting of the
American Academy of Forensic Sciences (Feb. 20, 2015); Andrew Sulner, Peer Reviews of
Forensic Casework: Understanding the Different Types of Standard Reviews and Why Courts
Have Ruled that Evidence of Casework Peer Reviews Performed by Non-Testifying Experts
is Inadmissible, Speech at the Annual Symposium of the Association of Forensic Document
Examiners (Oct. 29, 2016).
88
See supra note 86.
89
See generally IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 3, § 702.
90
There may be other circumstances where prior consistent statements are considered
allowable rehabilitation, see FED. R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(b)(ii), but the illustration is confined to
the rebuttal of recent fabrication as set out by FED. R. EVID. 801(D)(1)(b)(i).
91
See IMWINKELRIED ET AL., supra note 3, § 720. Professor Imwinkelried notes that
some jurisdictions also allow rehabilitation by prior consistent statement when there is a
suggestion that the live witness’s memory is faulty on direct examination.
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were admitted on the assertedly non-hearsay ground that independent of the
truth of either the statement from the witness stand or the prior statement, the
correspondence shows that the assertions were not made up as a result of the
suggested impetus to falsify.92 All purely accrediting information in the form
of an assertion by anyone, whether the witness or another, is admitted only
on such a non-hearsay rationale if there is no hearsay exception or exclusion
covering it.93 When the information only accredits the witness if it is true,
this is merely corroboration, and the proper objection is not “improper
bolstering,” but “improper corroboration by hearsay assertions not within
any exception.”94 It is hard to formulate a credible non-hearsay rationale for
the admission of opinions by other experts that the testifying expert’s
procedures were proper, or that the testifying expert’s opinions were
accurate. So the proper objection should probably be “improper bolstering
and improper corroboration by hearsay not within any exception,”
supplemented in a criminal case by an objection to the violation of the
Confrontation rights of the defendant95 if the witness is a witness for the
prosecution.
In Miller v. State of Florida,96 the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth
Circuit of Florida overturned a defendant’s conviction for robbery and
murder based, in part, on the trial court having permitted two government
handwriting experts to testify that their conclusions were subject to a peer
review process in which another analyst had corroborated their findings after
independently examining and analyzing the same evidence. The Florida
appellate court’s decision was based upon the evidentiary rules prohibiting
testimony bolstering and the constitutional right of Confrontation guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment.97
The Miller case involved a restaurant supervisor who was found duct
taped to a folding chair in the closed restaurant and shot in the head.98 The
only physical evidence linking the disgruntled ex-employee, Jesse Miller, to
the crime scene was a small amount of handwriting on a note pad that

92

Id.
Because instructions trying to make this distinction to the jury are ineffective in regard
to prior consistent statements of the witness him- or herself, most modern evidence codes
provide for a hearsay exception for qualifying prior consistent statements (or an exclusion
from being classified as hearsay, which is functionally the same thing). See FED. R. EVID.
801(D)(1)(b) (stating a hearsay exclusion); N.J. R. EVID. 803(a) (stating a hearsay exception).
94
I thank Edward Imwinkelried for pointing this out to me.
95
It is hard to imagine how such assertions might be categorized as “non-testimonial” as
that phrase is used in Crawford v. Washington and its progeny so as to escape confrontation
requirements.
96
Miller v. State, 127 So. 3d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
97
Id. at 586.
98
Id. at 581.
93
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contained the following writing: “‘55, 65, 9, 10,’ ‘4 time stop,’ ‘left right left
right.’”99
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court had erred in allowing
two handwriting experts to bolster their testimony by describing the peer
review process.100 The trial judge had overruled defense counsel’s objection
on the ground of “bolstering” and allowed the first handwriting expert (FDE
#1) to give the following testimony:
Q.
Okay. Does your conclusion have to be peer reviewed by
another analyst within the context of your laboratory?
A.

It does.

Q.

And is that part of your protocols and procedures?

A.

Yes.101

FDE #1 concluded with a “high degree of probability” that the defendant
executed the text on the yellow notepad, explaining that “high degree of
probability” meant it was a virtual certainty that the defendant had written
the text. The State then asked if his conclusion was contained in the report
issued by the lab:
Q.
Now, let me ask you this question: Was that the opinion
within the purview of your laboratory protocols?
A.
The ultimate conclusion that I just gave, the high degree of
probability, was the conclusion that exited the laboratory due to
the peer review process that we follow.
Defense Counsel: Objection, bolstering.
Court: Overruled.102

99
Id. at 581. “A partial print, sufficient for identification, was obtained from the duct
tape found on the victim. No identification was made despite numerous comparisons,
including the defendant’s. The latent fingerprints obtained from various surfaces at the crime
scene matched those of other employees, but not the defendant. The only latent fingerprint on
the yellow notepad belonged to the restaurant manager.” Id. at 581–82.
100
Id. at 585.
101
Id. at 583.
102
Miller, 127 So. 3d at 583.
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FDE #1 then went on to clarify that his initial conclusion was a “positive”
identification, which was a higher level of certainty than that contained in
the final report, and that it was only through the peer review process that the
initial conclusion went down one level to “high degree of probability.”103
The State then presented the testimony of a second examiner (FDE #2),
who testified that in his expert opinion, the defendant wrote the words and
numbers on the yellow notepad to the exclusion of everyone else.104 He
made a full identification, the highest conclusion in the field of forensic
document examination.105 The State then had FDE #2 testify about the peer
review of his findings, once again over defendant’s objection that such
testimony constituted improper bolstering, as reflected by the following
exchange:
Q.
When you formulate that opinion within the context of the
laboratory, for whom you worked at the time that you did this
work, are there quality assurance controls in place within the
context of that laboratory?
A.

Yes, we have—

Defendant:

Objection, Judge, bolstering.

Court:

Okay, I’m sorry. The objection is bolstering?

Defendant:

Bolstering, I’m sorry.

Court:

Overruled.

Q.
And could you explain to the members of the jury what
those quality assurance controls are?
A.
We have two different types of quality assurance
processes, one is a technical review and one is a confirmation.
Technical review, every tenth case normally that is examined is
reexamined by another examiner to ensure that the protocols have
been followed, the standards have been applied, and that the notes
and findings or that the notes, diagrams or whatever actually
support the conclusion that is being offered. Additionally, in our
laboratory, whenever there was an identification made, a separate
examiner is required to independently examine the evidence
associated with that case and reach his or her own conclusion. The
103
104
105

Id.
Id. at 584.
Id.
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identification would only go out of the laboratory based on our
own protocols if there’s confirmation.
Q.

And did you have that in this case?

A.

Yes, sir, I did.106

On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing the State’s two document examiners to testify about peer reviews
performed by other non-testifying examiners.107 In reversing the defendant’s
conviction, the appellate court agreed with the defense that the peer review
testimony constituted improper bolstering and was not harmless, providing
the following elucidating legal analysis:
In Schwarz v. State, we held that an expert may not testify that he
formed his opinion by consulting with others in the same field.
Subsequently, we extended the reach of that concept to preclude
an expert from bolstering—his own opinion on direct examination
with that of another expert.” We explained that this prohibitive
rule applies equally whether the expert relies on a second expert’s
opinion or testifies about other experts’ opinions in explaining the
process employed.
Here, the defendant specifically lodged a bolstering objection to
both examiners testifying about the process and called the court’s
attention to our decision in Bunche. Nevertheless, the court
overruled the objections and permitted the testimony. In doing so,
the trial court erred. We must next decide if the error was
harmless.
In State v. DiGuilio, our supreme court explained that: The
harmless error test . . . places the burden on the state . . . to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict or . . . that there is no reasonable
possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.
Here, as in Bunche, the handwriting examiners testified that they
“use[d] . . . a second examiner in the verification process.” The
first examiner testified that, “in our laboratory, whenever there
was an identification made, a separate examiner is required to
independently examine the evidence associated with that case and
106
107

Id.
Id. at 585.
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reach his or her own conclusion. The identification would only go
out of the laboratory based on our protocols if there’s
confirmation.” The second examiner testified that, “the high
degree of probability . . . was the conclusion that exited the
laboratory due to the peer review process that we follow.” Both
of these comments improperly bolstered the testifying experts’
findings because they relied on the “use of a second examiner in
the verification process.”
The State argues that no improper bolstering occurred because the
experts “were simply providing a general explanation of the [peer
review] process.” While that may be true, it does not eliminate
the harm of admitting the opinions of non-testifying experts to
bolster the testimony of those testifying. Instead, it deprives the
opposing party of the opportunity to cross-examine the nontestifying experts.
This was the reasoning in Bunche,
notwithstanding that we found the error harmless there.
The State attempts to distinguish Telfort and Bunche because it
presented two independent experts instead of one. The State
argues the expert examiners’ testimony was properly admitted
because their conclusions “were consistent with each other.” Two
wrongs do not make a right. Two instances of inadmissible
bolstering testimony do not ameliorate the harm and prejudice
simply because the experts come to the same conclusion. Rather,
two instances double the harm.
The State also suggests that Telfort, Bunche, and Potts v. State
conflict with cases from the Third and Fifth Districts. We
disagree. J.V. and Masters involved expert witnesses rendering
an opinion after reviewing “facts and data.” Such testimony is
entirely permissible under the Florida Evidence Code. There
simply is no conflict.
Because the defendant contested the experts’ conclusions that he
wrote the words and numbers on the yellow notepad, and those
opinions are the only real direct evidence placing the defendant at
the scene of the crime, we cannot find the error harmless.108

108

Id. at 585–86 (citations omitted). In Bunche, the court held the error to be harmless
because there was no dispute that the prints belonged to the defendant—the question was
when the defendant’s prints were left at the scene. Bunche v. State, 5 So. 3d 38, 41 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009).
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However, despite the well-reasoned opinion of the Florida District Court
of Appeal, prior case law from other states reflects differing opinions on
whether testimony about verification by a non-testifying expert should be
allowed or excluded on evidentiary grounds.109
VI.

GATEKEEPING: TRIAL JUDGES AND LAWYERS ARE STILL LARGELY
INEFFECTIVE IN PREVENTING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF UNRELIABLE OR
EXAGGERATED EXPERT TESTIMONY

The 2009 NAS Report recommended that the handling of forensic
science evidence in court be vastly improved, emphasizing the need to
challenge poor and marginal evidence from traditional forensic science
disciplines and to prevent the admissibility of unreliable or exaggerated
opinion evidence.110 Unfortunately, very little improvement has been seen in
this area of great concern to the interests of justice.111 This may be due to
how members of the bench and bar have traditionally viewed their respective
roles. Although all judges will acknowledge the need to exclude expert
opinions that are so weak or speculative that they would tend to mislead or
confuse the jury, many still seem to have difficulty in distinguishing between
opinion evidence that is shaky but admissible from that which is unreliable
and inadmissible.112 Perhaps out of fear of being reversed on appeal, judges
may be too reluctant to exclude proffered evidence as being unreliable,
preferring instead to let that issue be resolved through the traditional means
of attacking weak or marginal evidence: cross-examination and presentation
of contrary proof.113 Regrettably, experience has shown that far too many
109
Prior decisions from other states disallowing such testimony include: Bell v. State, 724
S.W.2d 780, 800–01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (explaining the question of whether a fingerprint
expert’s ID of a print was verified by another expert is improper since it is an attempt to
bolster the testifying expert’s testimony, although such a question would be proper as a
predicate to introducing the second technician’s analysis); State v. Wicker, 832 P.2d 127,
128–30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Smith, 628 N.E.2d 1176, 1181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994);
State v. Connor, 937 A.2d 928, 930–32 (N.H. 2007) (explaining fingerprint expert’s testimony
regarding another expert’s verification is inadmissible hearsay, as the verification did not form
a basis for the testifying expert’s opinion, but was simply a prerequisite to the release of his
already formed opinion). Two prior decisions allowing such testimony are State v. Jones, 368
S.E.2d 844, 846–49 (N.C. 1988) (finding trial court properly permitted a fingerprint expert to
testify that another expert had checked and concurred with the testifying expert’s conclusion,
because under the standard procedures followed by the expert, he could not have arrived at
and testified to his opinion without the verification by the other expert); State v. Williams,
No. 95CA93, 1996 WL753216 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1996) (permitting fingerprint expert’s
testimony that he had his results verified by another fingerprint expert).
110
See 2009 NAS REPORT, supra note 43, at 4, 48.
111
Keelah E.G. Williams & Michael J. Saks, Why Don’t the Gatekeepers Guard the
Gates?: Comments Prompted by Edmond, 36 ADELAIDE L. REV. 109–24 (2015).
112
Id.
113
Even the Advisory Committee Note to FRE 702 provides that “rejection of expert
testimony is the exception rather than the rule” and that “[t]he trial court’s role as gatekeeper
is not intended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system.” FED. R. EVID. 702
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trial lawyers are ill-equipped to challenge unreliable expert testimony,
especially in the criminal justice system, where defense attorneys lack the
resources needed to obtain the expertise required to successfully challenge
such testimony.
A. The Responsibility of Gatekeepers Regarding Proffered Expert
Testimony
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 (FRE 702) provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.114
To be admissible under FRE 702, the expert and/or the lawyer offering
the expert testimony must provide the trial judge with a warrant for believing
that (a) the expert possesses sufficient skill with regard to performing the
particular task at hand, and (b) reliable inferences can be drawn from the
reliable performance of that particular task.115
As the gatekeeper entrusted with determining whether to admit or
exclude expert testimony, scrutiny of the proffered expert’s qualifications is
but one factor that the trial judge must consider. Once the proffered witness
is qualified as an expert, the trial court’s gatekeeping function requires more
than simply “taking the expert’s word for it” and allowing the witness to
testify simply because he or she was qualified as an expert. Before any

advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment.
114
FED. R. EVID. 702.
115
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael made it clear that the
evaluation must be directed to the reliability of the expertise in the specific “task at hand.”
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
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proffered expert testimony can be admitted, the trial judge must also
scrutinize the relevance and reliability of the proffered testimony.
Under FRE 702, as under Daubert116 and Kumho,117 trial courts must118
scrutinize not only the principles and methods used by the expert, but also
whether those principles and methods have been properly applied to the facts
of the case. When an expert purports to apply principles and methods in
accordance with professional standards, yet reaches a conclusion that other
experts in the field would not reach, the trial court may fairly suspect that the
principles and methods have not been faithfully applied.119 “Any step that
renders the analysis unreliable . . . renders the expert’s testimony
inadmissible. This is true whether the step completely changes a reliable
methodology or merely misapplies that methodology.”120
B. Factors Relevant and Material to Properly Assessing the
Reliability of Proffered Opinion Evidence Under Rule 702
The most effective way for a court to evaluate reliability and the
likelihood of error associated with proffered expert testimony is to examine
with critical common sense the methodology used and reasons given for a
conclusion under the circumstances of the specific task at hand in the case.121
This requires evaluating the reasoning used in forming an expert opinion and
determining if it is properly grounded, well-reasoned, and not speculative.
As long as the court’s analysis focuses on the expert’s methods and
reasoning, and not on the expert’s conclusions, its actions are proper.122
Trial judges must consider various factors in determining whether expert
testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact. The
Advisory Committee’s Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended
in 2011, describes three factors that are relevant and material to properly
assessing the reliability of proffered opinion evidence as follows:
a) whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion;
b) whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious
alternative explanations; and
116

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
118
Rule 702 not only vests the trial judge with the authority to scrutinize and evaluate the
expert’s methodology and reasoning, it requires the trial judge to do so. Claar v. Burlington
N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1994).
119
See Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 598 (9th Cir. 1996).
120
In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994).
121
This was the guidance offered by the Supreme Court in Kumho. See Kumho, 526 U.S.
at 149.
122
See Kennedy v. Collagen, 161 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998).
117
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c) whether the expert “is being as careful as he would be in his
regular professional work outside his paid litigation
consulting.”123
For trial judges to make a meaningful reliability assessment using the
above criteria, they need to know the discipline’s best practices and
guidelines for performing the task at hand, as set forth in consensus standards
adopted by the profession, learned treatises, and relevant case law. Such
knowledge is essential to performing the gatekeeping task of distinguishing
between evidence that is shaky and admissible from that which is unreliable
and inadmissible.
When an expert’s departure from an acknowledged professional
standard or best practice can be shown to have produced an illogical or
exaggerated opinion, the decision to exclude such an opinion should become
relatively straightforward. However, a review of relevant appellate court
decisions shows this to be easier said than done.
C. Court Decisions Illustrating Unreliable and Critically Flawed
Testimony on the Part of Presumptively Well-Qualified
Handwriting Experts That Should Have Been Excluded by the
Trial Judge
1. Improper Methodology—Using Exemplar Signatures of a
Remote Date to Support an Opinion of Forgery
Hardin v. Montgomery,124 a Kentucky case involving allegations of
election misconduct and violations of the Corrupt Practices Act, provides a
good example of an appellate court conducting the necessary reliability
assessment of handwriting identification opinion evidence after the trial
court failed to do so. The trial court admitted expert testimony concerning
voter signatures, with ABFDE Diplomate Thomas W. Vastrick125 and BFDE

123

FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2011 amendment (“Daubert requires
the trial court to assure itself that the expert ‘employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.’” (quoting
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).
124
Hardin v. Montgomery, No. 2015-CA-000305, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 94 (Ky. Ct.
App. June 12, 2015).
125
Mr. Vastrick was and is a presumptively well-qualified FDE, having been, inter alia,
certified by the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (ABFDE), Chair of the
Questioned Document Section of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS), and
a longstanding member of the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners
(ASQDE).
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Diplomate Steven A. Slyter126 testifying for opposite sides.127 Mr. Vastrick
testified that the signatures of forty-three voters did not match the signatures
on their voter registration cards, which was the only reference exemplar he
used for comparison purposes.128 All the comparisons performed by Mr.
Vastrick were based upon photocopies and consisted solely of one-to-one
comparisons between the challenged voter signature and the signature
appearing on the named individual’s voter registration card. Of the thirtyeight dated signature pairs compared by Montgomery’s expert (Mr.
Vastrick), seven pairs had time differences of forty plus years, eleven pairs
had time differences of thirty to thirty-nine years, four pairs had time
differences of twenty to twenty-nine years, and seven pairs had time
differences of ten to nineteen years.129 FDE Slyter testified that the
methodology employed by Mr. Vastrick violated established professional
standards and best practices for performing handwriting comparisons and
was wholly improper and unreliable.130 Based in large part on Mr. Vastrick’s
testimony the trial court found, inter alia, voter fraud and other election law
violations, and voided the election.131 The Kentucky Court of Appeals
affirmed by a 2-1 vote132 over a blistering dissent by Judge Thompson, who,
in evaluating Vastrick’s methodology, found it to be fundamentally
unreliable and critically flawed, stating:

126

Mr. Slyter was and is a presumptively well-qualified FDE, having been, inter alia,
certified by the Board of Forensic Document Examiners (BFDE), President of the BFDE, a
longstanding member of the Association of Forensic Document Examiners (AFDE), and
author of a well-recognized treatise on forensic signature analysis, FORENSIC SIGNATURE
EXAMINATION, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Springfield (1995).
127
There are two boards that certify forensic document examiners, both of which are
accredited by the Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board (FSAB), which was established in
2000 by the National Institute of Justice, the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, and
the National Forensic Science Technology Center to serve the same function for forensic
science disciplines as that served for medical specialties by the American Board of Medical
Specialties. See Forensic Specialties Accreditation Board, Inc., (Mar. 16, 2018),
http://thefsab.org/. The Board of Forensic Document Examiners (BFDE) was the first board
to be accredited by FSAB in 2006; the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners
(AFDE) became FSAB-accredited in 2007. Document examiners certified by either of these
Boards are designated as “Diplomates.”
128
Id. at *9.
129
Forensic Document Examination Report of Thomas W. Vastrick, Montgomery v.
Magoffin Cty. Bd. of Elections, No. 14-ci-00371, 2015 WL 4876464 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Feb. 20,
2015) (on file with author); Transcript of Record, Montgomery, 2015 WL 4876464 (Thomas
W. Vastrick’s Testimony) (on file with author).
130
This was derived from court opinions (see supra note 124, infra note 134) and
supplemented by information provided by Steven Slyter, including the Magoffin County
Kentucky Circuit Court video of his testimony on February 9, 2015, which is on file with
author.
131
Hardin v. Montgomery, No. 2015-CA-000305, 2015 Ky. App. LEXIS 94, at *36 (Ky.
Ct. App. June 12, 2015).
132
Id. at 11.
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Montgomery’s handwriting expert, Thomas Vastrick, provided
only marginally reliable evidence of forgeries. The other
handwriting expert, Stephen Styler [sic], testified that Vastrick’s
one-to-one comparison of signatures was an unreliable method
and could not establish any forgeries. Even our case law teaches
that comparison of a single signature with a challenged signature
is not a reliable method to determine the authenticity of the
signature.133
The Supreme Court of Kentucky granted certiorari to review the case,
and on August 16, 2016, issued an opinion134 reversing the Court of Appeals,
and stating, inter alia:
Montgomery introduced at the trial the testimony of Thomas
Vastrick, an expert on handwriting analysis who had examined
voter signatures on the election day voter roster at the Flat Fork
precinct and on the absentee ballot materials. Vastrick opined that
the signatures of forty-three Flat Fork voters did not match the
corresponding signature on the voter’s voter registration card; that
fourteen voter signatures on voting precinct forms did not match,
and that twenty-six voter signatures on the absentee ballots did not
match the corresponding signature on the voter’s absentee ballot
application. The implication of his opinion is that eighty-three
votes cast in the names of those voters were cast by imposters who
forged the signatures of the registered voter. Only two of the
eighty-three voters were called as witnesses and both refuted the
insinuated forgery. Both verified the authenticity of their
signatures on the voting roster and attested to having personally
cast the votes recorded in their names. One of the voters explained
that her current signature might look different than the signature
on her voter registration card because the latter was signed thirty
years prior, when she was eighteen, and the former was signed on
election day. The other voter testified that he was left-handed, and
because he had a broken left arm on election day he had to sign
the voter roster with his right hand. None of the other voters
whose election day signature was identified by Vastrick as suspect
were called to testify. Montgomery’s attempt to demonstrate that
imposters cast ballots in place of legitimate registered voters by
forging their signatures falls woefully short. Proving the
suspected forgeries would have been relatively easy because the
names and addresses of the eighty-three voters whose signatures
133
134

Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
Hardin v. Montgomery, 495 S.W.3d 686 (Ky. 2016).
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were suspect were readily available.
Appellants refuted Vastrick’s opinion with the countervailing
analysis by their handwriting expert, Stephen Styler [sic].
Ultimately, Vastrick conceded that he used an unreliable method
of handwriting comparison and could not definitively establish
any forgeries.
In this vein, our predecessor court has
acknowledged that the comparison of a single signature with a
challenged signature is not a reliable method to determine the
authenticity of the signature in question.135
Unfortunately, Mr. Vastrick is not the only presumptively wellqualified handwriting expert to commit this fundamental type of error, and
Hardin is not an isolated case of unreliable handwriting identification
opinion evidence escaping detection and exclusion at the trial level. For
instance, only a few years earlier, in another civil case involving questioned
voter signatures, Felder v. Storobin,136 a New York appellate court
discredited the same type of unreliable handwriting testimony on the part of
another presumptively well-qualified document examiner,137 who likewise
based an opinion of forgery on perceived differences appearing in signatures
of a remote date.
2. Illogical (Unfounded) Conclusion—Unjustifiably
Extrapolating from an Accepted Premise to an Unfounded
Conclusion
Adams v. Weber138 involved an action brought by Samuel D. Adams,
a/k/a Dale S. White, pursuant to an application for a writ of habeas corpus.
Adams claimed that his court-appointed defense attorney (Brankin) provided
ineffective assistance of counsel when representing him in connection with
a 2001 criminal case.139
As described in the South Dakota Circuit Court’s memorandum
decision, the underlying criminal prosecution arose out of an incident that
occurred while Gayle Wanous (“Ms. Wanous”) was working alone in her

135

Id. at 706–07 (citing Beauchamp v. Willis, 189 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Ky. 1945)).
953 N.Y.S.2d 602 (App. Div. 2012).
137
The handwriting expert who testified in this case was employed for thirty years with a
state police crime laboratory that allowed him to accept private sector civil casework; he was
board-certified by the American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (ABFDE) and was
a long-standing member of the Questioned Document Section of the American Academy of
Forensic Sciences (AAFS) and the American Society of Questioned Document Examiners
(ASQDE). The expert’s curriculum vitae and background information are on file with author.
138
2005 S.D. Cir. LEXIS 1 (S.D. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2005).
139
Id. at *7.
136

SULNER (DO NOT DELETE)

692

4/27/2018 8:04 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:631

flower shop.140 A Native American man entered the shop, identified himself
as Sam Adams, and said that he was on his lunch break from Dakota
Connection and wanted to buy some flowers for his girlfriend. As the
customer started to write out an enclosure card at the counter, he asked Ms.
Wanous to add something to his order.141 When Ms. Wanous went to a back
workroom to get something, she was struck from behind on the head. When
she awoke, she had no recollection of what had happened. After cleaning
the blood from her hands and head, she immediately called the police upon
noticing that her cash drawer was open and all the cash and checks had been
taken.142 Shortly after Chief Flannery and Sergeant Fisher of the Sisseton
Police Department arrived at the scene, Ms. Wanous was taken by
ambulance to a hospital where she remained for five days after her injuries
were discovered to include a four-inch cut to the back of her head, a fractured
skull, and a concussion. Four days after being discharged from the hospital,
Ms. Wanous provided the police with her initial statement regarding the
incident, and several days later (two weeks after the incident), Ms. Wanous
identified Adams from a photo lineup as the person who was in her store at
the time she was attacked.143 Defendant Sam Adams was subsequently
prosecuted for aggravated assault, first-degree robbery, and first-degree
burglary. A jury found Adams guilty of all three counts and he was
sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.144
The only physical evidence recovered from the scene that might link
the defendant to the crime was the small enclosure card found on the counter
that contained the hand printed phrase “To Karen From Sam.” No other
physical evidence was recovered to connect Adams to the crime scene—no
fingerprints, no blood, no DNA.145
In granting Sam Adams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the Circuit
Court determined that the defense attorney’s laziness and complete
incompetence undermined every aspect of Adams’ defense. The Court cited
numerous instances of gross ineptitude on the part of the indigent
defendant’s court-appointed attorney, with perhaps the most damaging one
being his total lack of preparation concerning handwriting analysis.146 With

140

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
142
Id. at *3.
143
Id. at *5–6.
144
Adams, 2005 S.D. Cir. LEXIS 1 at *1–6, *30.
145
Id.
146
Id. at *44. Defense attorney Brankin failed to request, let alone consult with, an expert
in forensic document examination, and stipulated to the State’s use of a handwriting expert
two weeks before the start of the trial. “Brankin did not review Runyon’s report prior to trial,
and had no knowledge of the technical standards used in handwriting analysis. . . . The skills
and diligence Brankin exhibited in regards to this issue fell well outside the objective standard
of reasonableness expected from competent trial counsel.” Id. at *44–45.
141
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respect to the trial testimony of the State’s handwriting expert, the Court
noted:
The State’s case against Adams was largely circumstantial in
nature. The State did not produce any witnesses to the alleged
crimes, other than the victim. The Sisseton Police Department did
not collect any evidence that directly tied Adams to the scene of
the crime. No fingerprints, weapon, or money was ever recovered.
A major piece of physical evidence presented to the jury was the
enclosure card left on Wanous’ counter. As related earlier, it was
inscribed with the words “To Karen, From Sam.” However, the
handwriting on the card was unnatural stick writing rather than
normal printing. The State alleged this card was written by
Adams. The defense maintained Adams did not write the card,
and believed Sergeant Fisher forged it as evidence against Adams.
The State employed a forensic document examiner, Karen
Runyon, as an expert to analyze the handwriting on the card.
Brankin never attempted to employ his own handwriting expert,
and never educated himself on the area of handwriting analysis.
Approximately two weeks before the start of trial he stipulated to
the use of Runyon as the handwriting expert without fully
reviewing the contents of her report.
Prior to issuing her report, Runyon received writing exemplars of
both Adams and Fisher that were analyzed against the card.
Runyon stated that she received an inconclusive result when she
analyzed Adams’ handwriting, but that she could conclusively
rule out Sergeant Fisher as the author. At trial, Runyon testified
to her inconclusive finding in regards to Adams, but went on to
detail similarities between Adams handwriting and the card.
Brankin allowed her to give lengthy testimony on the issue
without challenging her conclusions or prompting her to detail the
similarities between the two.147
Ms. Runyon testified that she had been employed as a FDE with the
Minneapolis Police Department since 1978, and had also been accepting
private sector civil casework assignments since 1988.148 Her professional
training included a four-year apprenticeship with the Questioned Document
Unit of the Indiana State Police, FBI and US Secret Service training courses,
147

Id. at *26–27.
Transcript of Record at 381–86, Adams v. Weber, 2005 S.D. Cir. LEXIS 1 (S.D. Cir.
Ct. 2001) (No. 03-107) (Karen Runyon’s Testimony); Karen Runyon’s Curriculum Vitae (on
file with author).
148
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and attendance at symposiums and workshops sponsored by professional
membership organizations in the field.149 She was a member of the
Questioned Document Section of the AAFS and the Midwestern Association
of Forensic Scientists (MAFS). Although not board certified, she had
testified approximately 190 times in local, state, and federal courts.150
At the habeas hearing, Adams presented evidence from three
handwriting experts: Allan Keown, Vickie Willard, and Pat Girouard. All
three experts, two of whom (Willard and Girouard) were Diplomates of the
Board of Forensic Document Examiners (BFDE),151 echoed essentially the
same concerns about the impropriety of comparing two sets of writings not
suitable for comparison, and Ms. Runyon’s bias in overstating an
inconclusive opinion and providing disingenuous testimony.152 Each opined
that Ms. Runyon was allowed to offer improper opinions that contravened
the technical standards of handwriting analysis, and that Adams’ defense
attorney was not familiar with those standards and wholly unprepared to
meaningfully challenge the admissibility of Runyon’s opinions or to
impeach and discredit her testimony. The two technical standards at issue
were American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards, one
establishing best practices for performing handwriting examinations and the
other defining the standard terminology used by forensic document
examiners in expressing conclusions. Willard pointed out that as an active
member of ASTM Subcommittee E30.02 on Questioned Documents,
Runyon had actually participated in writing and developing the two ASTM
standards at issue.153
The technical deficiencies of the handwriting opinions and biased
nature of the trial testimony presented by Ms. Runyon (the State’s expert)
are specifically described below.
i. Incomparability of Writing Features: The Significance of
the Questioned Hand Printing Being Unnatural Stick
Printing and the Exemplars Being Natural Printing.
Ms. Runyon testified that the enclosure card found at the crime scene
was “written in unnatural stick printing . . . as a means of disguise.” Both
Sam Adams’ exemplars and Sergeant Fisher’s exemplars were admittedly
written in natural printing.154
149

Id.
Id.
151
See supra note 126; Board of Forensic Document Examiners, http://www.bfde.org/
(last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
152
Affidavit of Vickie L. Willard (Mar. 11, 2004) (on file with the author); Report of
Allan Keown (Nov. 30, 2003) (on file with the author); Affidavit of Pat Girouard (Mar. 11,
2004) (on file with the author).
153
Affidavit of Vickie L. Willard, supra note 152.
154
Transcript of Record, supra note 148, at 416.
150
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In comparing questioned writing consisting of unnatural stick printing
with exemplars consisting only of natural printing, Ms. Runyon departed
from the standard methodology and recognized best practices set forth in
ASTM Standard E2290-03, Standard Guide for Examination of Handwritten
Items (ASTM Standard E2290),155 which provides:
§ 7.6.1: If [the questioned writing] is not natural writing, or . . .
the available questioned writing is not suitable for comparison,
discontinue these procedures and report accordingly.
§ 7.9.1: If [the known writing] is not natural writing, or . . . the
available questioned writing is not suitable for comparison,
discontinue these procedures and report accordingly.
§ 7.11.1: If the bodies of writing are not comparable, discontinue
comparison and request comparable known writing, if
appropriate.
ii. Distorting an Inconclusive Opinion in a Manner That
Favors a Particular Outcome
Ms. Runyon’s conclusion as to whether Sam Adams wrote the
unnatural stick printing on the enclosure card (marked at trial as “Exhibit 4”)
was stated to be “inconclusive”, as indicated by the following excerpt from
the official transcript of her direct testimony:
Q: When you did your comparison of Exhibit 4 to the items related
to Sam Adams’ handwriting, what was your conclusion from the
comparison?
A: My conclusion was that I was inconclusive. There were both
similarities to Mr. Adams’ writing, as well as characteristics that
were not found in the sample that I had of this writer. So based
on the combination of what I had and what I did not have, I
determined that with what was submitted that, actually, a
conclusion could not be rendered in one direction or another.156

155
ASTM INTERNATIONAL, ASTM STANDARD E2290-03: STANDARD GUIDE
EXAMINATION OF HANDWRITTEN ITEMS 3 (2003).
156
Transcript of Record, supra note 148, at 392 (emphasis added).

FOR
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ASTM Standard E1658-96, Standard Terminology for Expressing
Conclusions of Forensic Document Examiners (ASTM Standard E1658),157
recommends and defines several terms that FDEs should use to express the
level of confidence associated with their opinion(s); it provides a
standardized framework for understanding the true meaning of the level of
confidence associated with an opinion or conclusion expressed by a FDE. As
defined in ASTM Standard E1658, the terms “inconclusive” and
“indeterminable” are synonymous and represent “the zero point of the
confidence scale”; these terms are “used when there are significant limiting
factors, such as disguise in the questioned and/or known writing or a lack of
comparable writing, and the examiner does not have a leaning one way or the
other.”158
Once Ms. Runyon expressed an inconclusive opinion as to whether
Sam Adams wrote the card and testified that no conclusion could be reached
one way or the other, the only proper and accurate statement that she could
make was that Sam Adams “cannot be eliminated or identified as the writer.”
However, Ms. Runyon chose to embellish her testimony with an inaccurate
and misleading statement designed to support the prosecution-favored
outcome, as reflected in the following exchange during her direct testimony:
Q: Ms. Runyon, you’re not saying that Sam did not write this
card?
A: No. You cannot eliminate him as a writer, no.
Q: But you’re not saying that he did?
A: Neither can you identify him positively as the writer, no.159
(Emphasis added)
Ms. Runyon’s gratuitous inclusion of the word “positively” in
testifying that Sam Adams cannot be eliminated or positively identified as
the writer clearly manifested bias in favor of the prosecution. This
overstatement was highly prejudicial to the defendant because it wrongfully
implied a “near match,” i.e., that the defendant can be identified as the writer,
but just not positively. This form of disingenuous testimony is not
uncommon in criminal cases involving prosecution handwriting experts who
appear to be unduly influenced or motivated to testify in a manner that
157
ASTM INTERNATIONAL, ASTM STANDARD E1658-96: STANDARD TERMINOLOGY FOR
EXPRESSING CONCLUSIONS OF FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS (1996).
158
Id. at 2.
159
ASTM STANDARD E1658-96, supra note 157, at 1.
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suggests support for the inculpatory hypothesis even when the evidence itself
favors neither the inculpatory nor exculpatory hypothesis.
iii. Misinterpreting Evidence or Providing Exaggerated
Testimony to Support a Favored Outcome
The defense maintained that Adams did not write the card, and
suggested that Officer Fisher fabricated it as evidence against Adams.160 The
following excerpt of Runyon’s trial testimony concerns the results of her
examination and comparison of the unnatural stick printing on the enclosure
card with the naturally written hand printing exemplars of Officer Fisher:
Q: What was your conclusion from the comparison of Officer
Fisher’s known handwriting to the questioned document?
A: My conclusion was that it was highly probable that he was not
the writer of the questioned material.161 (Emphasis added)
ASTM Standard E1658, supra, defines “highly probable” as meaning
that “the evidence is very persuasive” and “the examiner is virtually certain”
of the conclusion (opinion) expressed.162 Hence, Ms. Runyon concluded that
Officer Fisher could be eliminated with virtual certainty as the writer of the
unnatural stick printing appearing on the enclosure card.
As noted earlier, no conclusion could be rendered in one direction or
another regarding authorship of the questioned writing because the unnatural
stick printing appearing on the card was not suitable for comparison with the
naturally written exemplars available for both Adams and Officer Fisher.
Accordingly, an inconclusive opinion was warranted with respect to whether
Officer Fisher wrote the enclosure card for the same reason Ms. Runyon
reached an inconclusive opinion with respect to whether defendant Adams
wrote the card – unnatural stick printing cannot be compared to natural
printing.
The only way Officer Fisher could have properly been eliminated as
the writer of the enclosure card was by evidence showing that his writing
skills were so impaired as to have made it impossible for him to produce the
160
The Circuit Court pointed out inconsistencies in the trial testimony of the two police
officers that responded to the crime scene. “Chief Flannery and the victim both testified the
victim did not give the officers a physical description of the perpetrator. Sergeant Fisher stated
the victim did provide a description. The two officers testified inconsistently as to who arrived
before whom at the Treasure Chest. They both testified that the other was the officer to
actually pick up the enclosure card from Wanous’ counter. They both stated that they
considered the other officer to be in charge of the investigation.” Adams v. Weber, No. 03107, 2005 S.D. Cir. LEXIS 1, at *34–35 (S.D. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2005).
161
See supra note 148, at 415.
162
See supra note 157, at 1, § 4.1.
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unnatural stick printing at issue. Such evidence being absent, the inclination
on the part of the prosecution’s handwriting expert to disassociate the
disguised hand printing on the enclosure card from the natural hand printing
of Officer Fisher clearly reflects a biased conclusion derived from an
illogical interpretation of evidence, presumably resulting from Ms. Runyon’s
adoption of an adversarial role in which the outcome-oriented goal trumped
the truth-seeking goal.
3. Improper Methodology—Relying Solely Upon Post Litem
Motem Signatures Supplied by A Disclaiming Signatory to
Support an Opinion of Forgery (the Almeciga case)
Returning to Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting, discussed
in regard to the role of verification, supra, the plaintiff in the case denied
having signed or even seen the key document, a Release.163 As previously
noted, the putative expert called by the defense was Wendy Carlson. Ms.
Carlson had compared the contested signature to several “known” examples
provided by the plaintiff and concluded that the contested signature was a
forgery. All the known samples Carlson used were signed well after the
litigation commenced (post litem motem exemplars). Following a Daubert
hearing, U.S. District Court Judge Jed. S. Rakoff of the Southern District of
New York excluded the proffered testimony of plaintiff’s handwriting
expert, Wendy Carlson, finding that her testimony was far too problematic
to be admissible under Rule 702 as technical or otherwise ‘specialized’
expert testimony, even on a Kumho Tire approach,”164 and that her
“methodology [was] fundamentally unreliable and critically flawed in so
many respects [that her] testimony would be more likely to obfuscate the
issues in the case than to ‘help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine an issue.’”165
Judge Rakoff cited the following four factors as contributing to his
conclusion that Carlson’s handwriting opinion was unreliable and
inadmissible:
1) Bias (Carlson knew the favored outcome from the
start)166
2) “The subjectivity and vagueness of Carlson’s analysis
severely diminishes the reliability of Carlson’s
163

Almeciga v. Ctr. for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 409 (S.D.N.Y.

2016).
164

Id. at 424.
Id. at 426.
166
Judge Rakoff pointed out how the attorney who retained Ms. Carlson had engaged in
“blatant biasing tactics [that] compromised Ms. Carlson’s ability to provide a neutral
examination, a danger made even greater by the highly subjective nature of Carlson’s
methodology.” Id. at 425.
165
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methodology.”167
(3) Carlson’s analysis is “critically flawed” because she failed
to consider the possibility of disguise—that the disclaiming
signatory provided disguised signature exemplars when the
evidence clearly suggested that to be the case;168 and
(4) Striking contradictions between Carlson’s reports and incourt testimony “diminished Carlson’s credibility”169 such as:
(a) Carlson claimed to use ACE-V, but due to time
constraints, omitted the V (Verification),170 discussed in Part V.B,
supra.
(b) Carlson’s initial report stated that “the signature on the
Release was ‘made to resemble’ Plaintiffs,” but Carlson’s in-court
testimony acknowledged that the Release signature and the known
signatures “weren’t even close” and that the Release signature
“was not like an attempted forgery.”
Of the above four factors, only Ms. Carlson’s use of the self-serving
post litem motem exemplars supplied by the disclaiming signatory was
expressly stated by Judge Rakoff to have rendered Ms. Carlson’s analysis
“critically flawed.” As indicated supra, this departure from standard
methodology is acknowledged to be one of the principle sources of error in
opinions declaring a signature to be forgery. Hence, this factor alone
sufficed to render Ms. Carlson’s opinion unreliable and inadmissible under
Rule 702, especially given the fact that Judge Rakoff’s own inquiry led him
to view documents filed in other state court proceedings that contained ante
litem motem exemplar signatures of the plaintiff which he observed to be
remarkably similar to the contested signature she denied having signed or
even seen.171 Moreover, Judge Rakoff properly inferred that Ms. Carlson
167

Almeciga, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 426.
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
“[W]hile testimony that accounted for the possibility of disguise and addressed why
the ‘known’ signatures were not the product of intentional disguise could at least have
potentially assisted the trier of fact, Carlson did not offer such testimony. To the contrary,
Carlson confirmed at her deposition that she was ‘relying on the plaintiff’s representations
that [the known signatures] are accurate representations of her signature.’ This is a critical
flaw in Carlson’s methodology because it assumes away a key issue: whether Almeciga
intentionally disguised her handwriting in producing the known samples after this dispute was
initiated or whether the known samples accurately represent her actual handwriting. By
relying on plaintiff’s counsel’s representation that the ‘known’ signatures were accurate
representations of plaintiff’s signature, the result of Carlson’s analysis was effectively preordained and her testimony cannot be considered the ‘product of reliable principles and
methods.’ In fact, Carlson’s testimony has been excluded by at least one other court in part
on such a basis. See United States v. LeBeau, 2015 WL 4068158, at *8 (D.S.D. June 10, 2015)
(‘[Carlson’s] analysis and opinions entirely hinge on whether she received an accurate
‘known’ signature from [the defendant].’). The tainting effect of Carlson’s assumption in this
168
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had to have been aware of the distinct possibility that Ms. Almeciga supplied
her with disguised exemplar signatures because Ms. Carlson’s in-court
testimony acknowledged that the contested signature and the exemplar
(known) signatures “weren’t even close” and that the contested Release
signature “was not like an attempted forgery.”172
In finding that “handwriting analysis is unlikely to meet the
admissibility requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and that, in any
event, Ms. Carlson’s testimony does not meet these standards,” Judge
Rakoff’s use of the term “unlikely” implies something other than a definitive
finding, whereas the use of the phrase “in any event” indicates that what
follows constitutes the basis for his decision to exclude Ms. Carlson’s
testimony. This is consistent with the opinion of U.S. District Court Judge
Martinez in Crew Tile Distribution, which “[read] the exclusion of Carlson’s
testimony in Almeciga as resting on a case-specific analysis under Kumho
Tire,” and not on a general disqualification of forensic handwriting analysis
under Daubert.173
VII.

CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR PROCEEDING
FURTHER ALONG “THE PATH FORWARD”

A. What the Community of FDE Practitioners Needs to Do
1. Restate the Foundational Principles Supporting the
Discipline of Forensic Handwriting Analysis as a Technical
Skill
Unlike the Latent Print Examination community, the FDE community
has been slow to abandon the claim of uniqueness as a foundational basis for
forensic handwriting analysis. Despite recent court decisions pointing out
that uniqueness is something that has not been and probably never can be
validated by empirical proof,174 and that it is not a prerequisite for the
admissibility of handwriting identification opinion evidence as a technical
skill under Rule 702, the FDE community has yet to come to terms with the

regard may be gleaned from what she infers on the basis of her observation that the ‘signature
on the questioned document is written with great fluidity and a faster speed, unlike the known
signatures that display a slower, more methodical and unrefined style of writing.’ To Carlson,
who took on faith that the ‘known’ signatures were accurate representations of plaintiff’s
handwriting, this discrepancy is evidence that the Release was forged. Yet, at the Daubert
hearing, Carlson confirmed that slower, methodical handwriting was equally consistent . . . or
maybe even more consistent with someone trying to fake the known signatures[.]”Almeciga,
185 F. Supp. 3d at 425–26 (citations omitted).
172
Almeciga, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 426.
173
Crew Tile Distribution, Inc. v. Porcelanosa L.A., Inc., No. 13-cv-3206, 2016 WL
8608447, at *9 (D. Colo. Sept. 12, 2016).
174
See discussion of U.S. v. Kelly and U.S. v. Johnsted in supra Part II.
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need to restate the foundational principles supporting the discipline of
forensic handwriting analysis.
The theory of uniqueness needs to be replaced with a neuroscience
model based upon motor control behavior and complexity theory, along the
lines discussed in Part III of this Article. Practitioners must abandon the
practice of characterizing the discipline of forensic handwriting analysis as
a “science,” or describing handwriting examinations as “scientific.” FDEs
need to acknowledge the subjectivity of forensic handwriting analysis and
understand that the subjectivity of a claimed expertise does not preclude a
court from finding that such expertise is sufficiently reliable as a technical
skill to be admitted as opinion evidence under Rule 702, as under Daubert
and Kumho Tire.
2. Develop More Robust and Transparent Best Practice
Standards for Examining Handwritten Items and Expressing
Opinions in Reports and Testimony
The FDE community has been more active than any other forensic
discipline in producing professional standards, having published an array of
twenty-one standards through ASTM International, a private consensus
standards development organization (SDO).175 Most of those standards were
initially drafted by the FBI-funded Scientific Working Group for Forensic
Document Examination (SWGDOC) and thereafter were revised and voted
upon by members of ASTM’s Questioned Documents Subcommittee
E30.02, one of several discipline-specific subcommittees operating under the
umbrella of ASTM Main Committee E-30 on Forensic Science.176
Unfortunately, the content of some of those standards was not without its
critics, and the criteria used by E30.02 officers in classifying voting interests
resulted in the filing of formal complaints and appeals alleging that the
E30.02 Questioned Document subcommittee’s method of classifying voting
interests produced an imbalance in stakeholder interests that contravened the
SDO’s essential due process requirements.177 In April 2012, confronted with
allegations of due process violations and of improperly using the ASTM
standards development process to obtain an unfair economic advantage in
the marketplace of forensic document examination services, the coalition of
public sector subcommittee members opted to use their supermajority
control of voting to shut down Subcommittee E30.02 and return to using the

175

See ASTM Int’l, Subcommittee E30.90 on Executive, https://www.astm.org/C
OMMIT/SUBCOMMIT/E3090.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
176
See ASTM Int’l, Standards Formerly Under the Jurisdiction of E30.02 on Questioned
Documents, https://www.astm.org/COMMIT/forensic-docs/index.html (last visited Mar. 19,
2018).
177
Letter from Andrew Sulner to Steve Orthey, Sec’y, ASTM Committee of Technical
Committee Operations (COTCO) (July 14, 2009) (on file with author).
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SWGDOC group to generate best practice standards for the FDE
profession.178
Since best practice standards and guidelines produced by professional
organizations or Scientific Working Groups (SWGs) do not meet the
requirements of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
(NTTAA)179 for being voluntary consensus standards, the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) established in 2016 an SDO called
the AAFS Academy Standards Board (ASB) to develop voluntary consensus
standards, technical reports and best practice recommendations for forensic
science disciplines. The ASB has been accredited by the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI), which requires that all SDOs adhere to certain
essential requirements to ensure that its procedures for developing voluntary
consensus standards adhere to principles of fundamental fairness. These
requirements include openness (transparency), balance of stakeholder
interests, due process, and a meaningful appeals process.180 Perhaps the
biggest challenge facing the ASB will be to ensure that its forensic standards
development process is not dominated by a single stakeholder interest and
that the standards it promulgates do not conflict with standards proposed by
NIST, which formed the Organization of Scientific Area Committees
(OSAC) for Forensic Science “to strengthen the nation’s use of forensic
science by facilitating the development of technically sound forensic science

178

Group-serving bias, characterized by coordinated action towards a common goal by
members of a specific group or coalition, is yet another source of bias that impacts all sorts
of decision-making within the forensic science community. It is one of the dangers and risks
of having the process for developing forensic standards controlled by members of the law
enforcement community or any other coalitional alliance, especially when it comes to the
development of standards recommending minimum training requirements for practitioners
such as forensic document examiners. This became apparent with the closure of ASTM
Subcommittee E30.02 on Questioned Documents, which ensued after private sector voting
members of E30.02 and other interested stakeholders filed appeals and registered complaints
alleging that a coalition of E30.02 subcommittee members affiliated with government
agencies and government-sponsored membership organizations were violating ASTM due
process requirements and federal antitrust laws prohibiting unfair trade practices. See Andrew
Sulner, A Critical Look at Some Needed Reforms in the Landscape of Forensic Science
Education and Mentorship Training Standards, 24 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 73
(2014); Vickie Willard, ASTM Committee E30 on Forensic Sciences: The History of
Subcommittee E30.02 on Questioned Documents, ASS’N FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINERS
(2013), http://afde.org/resources/The-History-of-E30-02.pdf.
179
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA), Pub. L. No.
104-113, 110 Stat. 775 (1996), directs that except where inconsistent with applicable law or
otherwise impractical, all federal agencies and departments must use technical standards that
are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, in lieu of creating
proprietary, non-consensus “in-house” standards.
180
See Am. Acad. of Forensic Sci., Why Do We Need an SDO If We Have the OSAC?,
ACAD. NEWS (Aug. 4, 2016), https://news.aafs.org/asb-news/why-do-we-need-an-sdo-if-wehave-the-osac/; AAFS Standards Board, https://asb.aafs.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
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standards and by promoting the adoption of those standards by the forensic
science community.”181
i. Handwriting Examinations: The Need for Standards to
Incorporate Practical Measures Designed to Reduce the
Potential for Cognitive Bias
Reducing the Likelihood that Cognitive Bias Will Taint the Examiner
ASTM E2290, Standard Guide for the Examination of Handwritten
Items, was the only consensus standard adopted by the FDE profession that
set forth best practice guidelines for performing forensic handwriting
examinations.182 First published in 2003, it was reviewed once thereafter in
2007, and republished by ASTM without any substantive change from the
2003 version. E2290 expired without renewal upon the closure of
subcommittee E30.02 in 2012, but it has since been republished as SWGDOC
Standard for Examination of Handwritten Items, which contains the same
language as the E2290 standard, apparently with the permission of ASTM
International. Each of these published versions of a Standard Guide for the
Examination of Handwritten Items fails to mention, let alone suggest, the
implementation of protocols designed to reduce potentially biasing
influences, especially contextual bias.183
The FDE community’s resistance to implementing bias control measures
as standard protocol may be attributable to the fact that there are still far too
many FDEs who remain adamant in their belief that everything is relevant to
the tasks they perform, or that proper training and experience, or board
certification, renders them immune from being influenced by task-irrelevant
case information. Or, it may simply result from the natural tendency of
human beings to take comfort in knowing that their subjective opinions
(“expert” or not) are confirmed by independent facts they believe to be true
at the time, even though those facts may subsequently prove to be false, such
as an eyewitness account or a defendant’s confession.
At the very least, I believe the concept of sequential unmasking needs to
be accepted and implemented as a standard protocol for forensic handwriting
investigations, with guidelines established for identifying what types of
181

The Organization of Scientific Area Committees for Forensic Science, NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH. (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/organizati
on-scientific-area-committees-osac (last updated Mar. 13, 2018).
182
See ASTM Int’l, ASTM E2290-07a: Standard Guide for Examination of Handwritten
Items (2007), https://www.astm.org/Standards/E2290.htm; Sci. Working Grp. for Forensic
Document Examination, SWGDOC Standard for Examination of Handwritten Items: Version
2013-1 (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/10/26/swg
doc_standard_for_examination_of_handwritten_items.pdf.
183
Id.
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information might be deemed to be domain-relevant, and at what stage of the
evidence evaluation process such information can be properly disclosed to
the analyst.184 Additionally, FDEs working in the private sector must be
encouraged to advise and forewarn attorneys and clients at the outset of the
initial communication discussing their possible retention as an expert, not to
disclose or imply what the favored outcome is, explaining why such
“blinding” would be preferable and ultimately in the client’s best interest.
Examiners working in both the public and private sectors should also make
every effort to use “blind testing” procedures to further facilitate an objective
analysis of the evidence and thereby effectively foreclose an opposing
attorney’s ability to use contextual bias as a means of impeaching otherwise
credible results and opinions.
“Blind Testing” Protocol Used to Examine Hand Printing in United States
v. Matusiewicz
Most recently, the benefits of using blind testing and sequential
unmasking procedures in performing forensic handwriting examinations
were expressly acknowledged by both the defense attorneys and the
prosecutors involved in United States v. Matusiewicz, the nation’s first
federal prosecution of defendants charged with “cyberstalking resulting in
death.”185 The defendants were a mother (Lenore), son (David), and
daughter (Christine), who were indicted under the new federal anticyberstalking statute after the father (Tom) gunned down the son’s ex-wife
and her friend in a Wilmington, Delaware courthouse lobby in 2013 while
walking into a child support hearing, before taking his own life. I was
retained as a handwriting expert in this case by Edson A. Bostic, Chief
Federal Public Defender for the District of Delaware, who was representing
the son, David Matusiewicz. At the very outset, I advised Mr. Bostic of the
need to avoid letting me know what his favored outcome is and that, to the
extent feasible, I be supplied with anonymous hand printing exemplars of
several individuals for purposes of comparing same to the questioned hand
printing. Accordingly, I was provided with digital photographs of four
documents bearing questioned hand printing (items I designated as Q-1
through Q-4) and scanned images of documents submitted as bearing hand
printing exemplars of four writers identified simply as Writers A, B, C, and
D.186 Based upon my examination of these items, I issued a report dated
184

See Bryan Found & John Ganas, The Management of Domain Irrelevant Context
Information in Forensic Handwriting Examination Casework, 53 SCI. & JUST. 154–58 (2013),
and authorities cited in note 1, supra.
185
See Lauren Walker, Family Receives Life in Prison for First-Ever Cyberstalking
Conviction, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/family-receives-lifeprison-first-ever-cyberstalking-conviction-430833.
186
To preserve anonymity of the exemplars, each document bearing known hand printing
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March 16, 2015 which set forth the basis for my opinions that the hand
printed entries appearing on item Q-1 were written by Writer C and the hand
printed entries appearing on items Q-2 through Q-4 were written by Writer
B.
Thereafter, I received a copy of an FBI Laboratory Report of
Examination dated January 27, 2015, prepared and issued by Daniel P.
Anderson of the Questioned Documents Unit of the FBI Laboratory in
Quantico, Virginia. Upon reading this report, I was shocked to discover that
Mr. Anderson had reached an inconclusive opinion with respect to who
authored items Q-2 through Q-4, despite having examined the same
documents that I had examined, albeit without using a “blind testing”
protocol.187 This was also when I first learned the identities of Writers A, B.
C and D, because FDE Anderson was provided with additional known
writing consisting of compulsory (request) exemplars of hand printing
specifically identified as having been obtained from David Matusiewicz (the
son), Lenore Matusiewicz (the mother), and Amy Gonzalez (the daughter),
as well as additional documents bearing known hand printing exemplars
attributable to Tom Matusiewicz (the deceased father and “shooter”). I was
also curious why six other items submitted to Mr. Anderson as bearing
questioned hand printing were never examined by him, and why the
document identified as Q-1 in my March 16, 2015 report was not submitted
to Anderson (and hence, not referenced in his report). It was then that I
learned that the Government was alleging that the “HL” hand printed at the
top of Q-1 stands for “Hit List,” and the hand printed names appearing
underneath the “HL included the name of the first federal judge assigned to
the case, who recused himself on that account.
I subsequently examined all documents submitted to FBI examiner
Anderson that I had not seen before, as well as higher resolution color
flatbed-scanned images of documents that I had previously received in the
form of photos taken with a digital camera. Based upon my examination of
these additional items, I prepared a second report dated June 16, 2015,
wherein I confirmed my conclusion that Writer B, now identified as Lenore
Matusiewicz, authored items Q-2 through Q-4, and that Writer C, now
identified as Tom Matusiewicz, authored item Q-1 as well as the six hand
printed items (designated by me as Q-5 through Q-10) that were submitted
to Anderson but never examined by him.
During my testimony, I used numerous illustrative charts to aid the jury
in observing the hand printing features that supported my opinions, and
stated, “quite frankly . . . any expert with basic elementary training would
was redacted to remove any information that could identify the writer.
187
The FBI Lab Report failed to provide any explanation or reason(s) why the
handwriting analyst (Anderson) concluded that the hand printing evidence submitted for
analysis was insufficient to render an opinion.
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have reached the same conclusion I did.”188 My expertise and opinions were
never challenged by the Government. But even more remarkable was the
following exchange that took place in the presence of the jury at the end of
my very brief cross-examination by Assistant United States Attorney
Edward J. McAndrew, a federal prosecutor with extensive trial experience
in high profile cases who, at the time, was the Justice Department’s
Cybercrime Coordinator and national security cybercrime specialist:
Q.
All right. And my last question for you, Mr. Sulner, is
should we need to hire you in the future, can we reach you at this
address?
A.

Yes, sir.

Mr. McAndrew:

Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor.189

After the case was concluded, Mr. Bostic wrote me a letter in which he
indicated his unequivocal support for the blind testing/sequential unmasking
protocol I utilized:
I thank you for the excellent work you did on my client’s behalf
in the above captioned matter. Over my 30 years of litigation, I
have worked with numerous experts, including other forensic
document examiners, architects and engineers, medical doctors,
psychologists,
accident
reconstruction
experts,
arson
investigators, construction management consultants, and
securities and other fraud experts, to name a few. Your
commitment, professionalism and thoroughness were at the
highest level of any expert with whom I have ever worked.
The most significant and impressive contribution you made to our
case by far, however, was your introduction of blind testing. This
was my first exposure to blind testing. Your insistence upon
utilizing this methodology clearly carried the day with respect to
the reliability of the findings and conclusions you reached and
testified to during trial. As you may recall, after presenting your
direct testimony, the government stood only to concede and
acknowledge the accuracy and significance of your findings,
while noting that they may want to use your services and/or your
188
Transcript of Trial Testimony at 5195, United States v. Matusiewicz, 165 F. Supp. 3d
166 (D. Del. 2015) (on file with author).
189
Id. at 5200. During the court recess that immediately followed my testimony, Mr.
McAndrew informed me that he asked me the last question because he wanted the record to
reflect that he and his fellow prosecutors disagreed with the inconclusive opinion(s) provided
by the FBI’s document examiner and considered my identification of the two writers to be
reliable and accurate.
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blind testing procedures in other similar matters going forward.
Of all the experts that we used or sought to admit at trial, your
report and testimony was the only one which the Government did
not challenge. Such concession, on critical documents in evidence
in this case, was essential to our defense theory and particularly
noteworthy given the FBI’s inconclusive findings based upon
their expert’s examination of the very same evidence you
examined and about which you testified. Therefore, I thank you
again for your hard work and dedication to my client’s case. . . .190
ii. Handwriting Examinations: The Need to Delineate the
Decision-Making Stages Involved in the Examination
and Evaluation Process
Specifying (“Mapping Out”) the Steps Involved in the Examination and
Evaluation Process
Both ASTM E2290 and its SWGDOC counterpart were too vague in
describing the procedures involved in the forensic examination of
handwritten items; they failed to address the various critical decisions that
are commonly made by examiners in the examination and interpretive phases
of performing forensic handwriting examinations. In 1999, the Journal of
Forensic Document Examination published a Modular Method for
Examining Handwriting (The Modular Method) that formed the framework
of the forensic handwriting methodology used by government laboratories
in Australia and New Zealand, as recommended by the Document
Examination Specialist Advisory Group (DocSAG) of Australia and New
Zealand.191 The Modular Method provided a series of modules describing
the nature of each decision to be made by an examiner at each stage of the
examination process, with a flow chart summarizing the decision-making
stages within each module. SWGDOC considered adopting this type of
modular approach in 2000 when it submitted its initial draft of a proposed
standard for examining handwritten items. However, that idea was
abandoned and has never been seriously reconsidered until recently,
undoubtedly precipitated by the invaluable input provided by the late Dr.
Bryan Found while a member of the NIST-OSAC Expert Working Group on
Human Factors in Handwriting Examination, and the publication in the

190
Letter from Edson A. Bostic, Del. Fed. Pub. Defender, to author (Sept. 11, 2015) (on
file with author).
191
Bryan Found & Doug Rogers, Documentation of Forensic Handwriting Comparison
and Identification Method: A Modular Approach, 12 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION
1 (1999).
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Journal of Forensic Document Examination of The Modular Forensic
Handwriting Method (2016 Version), an extensive update of the prior 1999
version.192
The Modular Forensic Handwriting Method (2016 Version), developed
by Found, Carolyne Bird, and their colleagues, consists of a series of ten
modules, the first of which is “The Method Flow Diagram,” a detailed
process map which summarizes the essential decision-making points and
options within the handwriting examination/evaluation process.193 Modules
2 through 10 provide detailed descriptions and graphic illustrations for each
of the evaluative and interpretive steps that a forensic handwriting analyst
needs to perform in reaching an opinion or conclusion, including an opinion
that the handwriting evidence is insufficient to warrant any conclusion.
These nine modules cover the following topic areas:
Module 2:
Module 3:
Module 4:
Module 5:
Module 6:
Module 7:
Module 8:
Module 9:
Module 10:

Determination of the suitability of questioned and
comparison samples: issues of comparability and
contamination
Comparison of handwriting samples
Non-original handwriting
The assessment of handwriting complexity:
addressing propositions regarding authorship
Structural and line quality dissimilarities
Traced writings
Unnatural handwriting behaviors
Line quality and skill
Evidence evaluation and reporting procedures

The Modular Forensic Handwriting Method (2016 Version) should
serve as a model for developing a handwriting examination standard that is
more rigorous and transparent than what the American community of FDEs
has developed to date, especially since Found and Bird reported positive
findings from a multi-year study of over 27,000 opinions expressed by 28
document examiners designed to test the validity of their modular
approach.194 By requiring examiners to document their decisions for each
decision point along the continuum of tasks involved in the examination and
interpretive stages of the process, the modular approach affords a more
effective and transparent means of evaluating the reliability of the key
decisions that purportedly support an examiner’s conclusion. For example,
one decision point of concern to the FDE community as well as the courts

192
Bryan Found & Carolyne Bird, The Modular Forensic Handwriting Method 2016
Version, 26 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 7 (2016).
193
Id.
194
Id. at 63–70.
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concerns an examiner’s decision as to whether perceptible differences
between two sets of writings should be attributable to natural variation (intrawriter variability), different writers (inter-writer variability), or disguise
(intentional distortion), especially in view of research indicating that
presumptively well-trained FDEs have a high error rate when performing
tasks of this nature.195
Developing a robust and transparent American national handwriting
examination standard along the lines of The Modular Forensic Handwriting
Method (2016 Version) would serve to alleviate some of the criticisms
directed at the subjectivity of forensic handwriting examination as well as
improve the accuracy and strengthen the probative value of handwriting
identification opinions expressed by trained examiners.
iii. Handwriting Identification Opinions: The Need to Establish
More Meaningful and Appropriate Language for
Expressing Qualitative Levels of Confidence (Certitude)
The problems associated with document examiners using different
terminology in reporting the results of handwriting comparisons was
brought to the forefront in a series of articles written by McAlexander, Ellen,
and Purdy in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s.196 Their suggested language
for use in expressing handwriting identification opinions was later presented
in a 1991 article published as a Letter to the Editor in the Journal of Forensic
Sciences that proposed the use of a nine-level scale comprising terms for
expressing subjective (non-quantified) estimates of probability with respect
to handwriting identification opinions.197 The 1991 article was adopted as
recommended guidelines in reports and testimony by the Questioned
Document Section of the AAFS and the ABFDE.198 The nine-level scale
consisted of a positive category of four rank-ordered expressions of
confidence level—identification (definitely did write), strong probability did
write, probably did write, and indications (evidence to suggest) may have
written; a neutral category—inconclusive (no conclusion); and a negative
category of the corresponding four rank-ordered levels of confidence—

195
See D. Michael Risinger, Cases Involving the Reliability of Handwriting Identification
Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert, 43 TULSA L. REV. 477, 549 (2008).
196
Thomas V. McAlexander, The Meaning of Handwriting Opinions, 5 J. POLICE SCI. &
ADMIN. 43 (1977); D.M. Ellen, The Expression of Conclusions in Handwriting Examination,
12 CANADIAN SOC’Y FORENSIC SCI. J. 117 (1979); Dan C. Purdy, The Requirements of
Effective Report Writing for Document Examiners, 15 CANADIAN SOC’Y FORENSIC SCI. J. 146
(1982).
197
Thomas V. McAlexander, Jan Beck & Ronald M. Dick, The Standardization of
Handwriting Opinion Terminology, 36 J. FORENSIC SCI. 311, 314–16 (1991).
198
Id. at 311. These guidelines were later incorporated in a consensus standard first
published in 1996 as ASTM Standard E-1658, Standard Terminology for Expressing
Conclusions of Forensic Document Examiners.
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elimination (definitely did not write), strong probability did not write,
probably did not write, and indications (evidence to suggest) may not have
written.
On February 28, 1995, ABFDE Diplomate Mary Wenderoth Kelly
testified at a Daubert hearing in United States v. Starzecpyzel199 about the
FDE profession’s adoption of the nine-level scale as the standard
terminology to be used by FDEs in reporting the results of handwriting
examinations.200 United States District Court Judge McKenna of the
Southern District of New York was unimpressed; he rejected the nine-level
scale, finding that it is highly subjective and imprecise and can easily lead to
misleading and improper testimony.201
Undaunted by Judge McKenna’s April 3, 1995 decision in Starzecpyzel,
on September 10, 1995, ASTM Subcommittee E30.02 on Questioned
Documents voted to approve the nine-level scale as a consensus standard for
expressing handwriting identification opinions, and it was officially
published in April 1996 as ASTM Standard E1658-05, Standard
Terminology for Expressing Conclusions of Forensic Document Examiners.
Subsequently, the original 1996 version of E1658 was reviewed and
republished without any substantive changes in 1997, 2004 and 2008. From
1996 until now, ASTM E1658 has been routinely cited by FDEs as the
profession’s consensus standard for expressing handwriting identification
opinions in reports and testimony.
When I first read Judge McKenna’s decision in Starzecpyzel, I was
relieved to see that a prominent jurist shared the same concerns about
vagueness and unreliability that I had expressed in negative votes and
comments whenever ASTM E1658 came up for discussion and review as an
ASTM standard. What was most troubling to me as a lawyer and a forensic
document examiner was that ASTM E1658 sanctioned testimony “that there
is evidence which indicates (or suggests) that the John Doe of the known
material may have written the questioned materials but the evidence falls far
short of that necessary to support a definite conclusion”202 The “Discussion”
paragraph inserted as a note immediately following the definition of
“indications” in each and every published version of the ASTM E1658
standard contained the following caveat:
This is a very weak opinion, and a report may be misinterpreted
to be an identification by some readers if the report simply states,
“The evidence indicates that the John Doe of the known material
wrote the questioned material.” There should always be additional
199
200
201
202

United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1048.
ASTM INT’L, ASTM E1658-08 2 § 4.1(2008).
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limiting words or phrases (such as “may have” or “but the
evidence is far from conclusive”) when this opinion is reported, to
ensure that the reader understands that the opinion is weak. Some
examiners doubt the desirability of reporting an opinion this
vague, and certainly they cannot be criticized if they eliminate this
terminology. But those examiners who are trying to encompass
the entire “gray scale” of degrees of confidence may wish to use
this or a similar term.203
Unfortunately, my FDE colleagues in ASTM failed to appreciate my
objection that this type of handwriting opinion is so weak and vague that its
probative value is outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect204 because
fact finders are likely to overvalue such a weak and speculative opinion. My
unwavering objection to the admissibility in evidence of such a “low level
of confidence” opinion was reinforced by the lessons I learned from my
many years of casework (not to mention the lessons handed down from my
mother and her father, Professor Julius Fischhof), as well as my training in
the law, all of which taught me that this type of opinion amounts to no more
than a guess, and rarely an educated one given the subjectivity of forensic
handwriting analysis. On those rare occasions when an objection was raised
by an attorney, some courts have likewise been troubled by the inherent
unreliability of an “indications opinion,” either excluding it altogether or
imposing restrictions on it.205
In 2009, the FBI announced, to my great satisfaction, that the ASTM
“indications” expression would no longer be allowed and that such levels of
confidence must be reported as “no conclusion.”206 At the same time, the
FBI laboratory announced that it would be using a five-level scale for
expressing handwriting identification opinions instead of the nine-level scale
contained in the ASTM E1658 standard.207 The FBI’s five-level scale
contained a positive category permitting only two possible expressions
(“identification” and “may have written”), the standard neutral category (“no
203

Id.
See FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”).
205
See, e.g., Barnett v. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co., No. 06-2171, 2007 WL 7611185
(W.D. Tenn. Nov. 19, 2007); People v. Todman, 53 V.I. 431 (2010).
206
See Diana Harrison, Ted M. Burkes & Danielle P. Seiger, FBI, Handwriting
Identification: Meeting the Challenge of Science and the Law, 11 FORENSIC SCI. COMM. (Oct.
2009), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications/fsc/o
ct2009/review/2009_10_review02.htm.
207
See DEP’T OF JUST., PROPOSED UNIFORM LANGUAGE FOR TESTIMONY AND REPORTS
FOR THE FORENSIC HANDWRITING ANALYSIS DISCIPLINE 1, https://www.justice.gov/archive
s/dag/file/877746/download (last visited Mar. 19, 2018).
204
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conclusion”), and a negative category of two possible expressions
(“elimination” and “may not have written”).208 Clearly, this was a significant
and welcome improvement from my perspective.
To date, there is still no uniform standard for expressing handwriting
identification opinions in reports and testimony. Indeed, even the FBI and
the Department of Justice (DOJ) have conflicting views on this subject. The
DOJ recently issued a document titled Department of Justice Proposed
Uniform Language for Testimony and Reports for the Forensic Handwriting
Analysis Discipline, which, if adopted, would “apply to Department of
Justice personnel who perform examinations and/or provide expert witness
testimony regarding the forensic examination of handwriting evidence.”209
On its face, the DOJ proposal lists a five-level scale consisting of a positive
category of two opinion levels (“identification” and “qualified opinion(s) did
not write”); the standard neutral category (“no conclusion”); and a negative
category of two levels (“elimination” and “qualified opinion(s) did not
write”).210 However, the proposal then states that “[t]he strength or weakness
of a (positive) qualified opinion will be provided by the use of any of the
following terms: “Strong Probability Did Write, Probably Did Write, and
Indications May Have Written,” and the corresponding negative of these
three expressions may be used to express the strength or weakness of a
negative qualified opinion.211 By doing so, the DOJ proposal seeks to
reinstate the nine-level scale of ASTM E1658 that was specifically rejected
by the FBI.
Clearly, the FDE community needs to address this critical divide by
doing some serious soul-searching before deciding upon the appropriate
uniform language for expressing handwriting identification opinions in
reports and testimony. In my view, objective and reasonable minds will, at
the very least, agree that the highly problematic and speculative
“indications” opinion should not be allowed.
In the same vein, serious consideration needs to be given to proposals
suggesting the avoidance altogether of the term “identification” or any other
categorical conclusion regarding source attribution in favor of expressing
conclusions in terms of the degree of support that exists for one proposition
over another. This school of thought is predicated upon the fact that as with
every other forensic pattern-matching discipline, the handwriting analyst
begins with two alternative propositions (hypotheses) when comparing sets
of questioned and known handwriting: (1) the two sets came from the same
source (writer) or (2) the two sets came from different sources (writers).
Essentially, it allows the analyst to make a subjective assessment of the
208
209
210
211

Id.
Id. at 1–2.
Id.
Id.
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strength of the evidence in support of one proposition over the other
proposition based upon the analyst’s observations from examining and
comparing the evidence. This school of thought has found support among
forensic document examiners in Australia and New Zealand,212 and in the
2012 Report of the NIST Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent
Print Analysis, which recommended that latent print examiners avoid
categorical conclusions about whether two sets of prints have a common
source and use a more moderate expression such as, “it is far more probable
that this degree of similarity would occur when comparing the latent print
with the defendants’ fingers than with someone else’s fingers.”213
For me, prohibiting the “indications” opinion is essential, whereas
eliminating the “identification” opinion is not, so long as it is explained to
mean that the extensive degree of similarity observed in the handwriting
features of the questioned and known writing warrants the belief that the only
plausible explanation for such a concurrence is that the questioned and
known writing have a common source. As I noted in Part II.C, supra,
demonstrable evidence of shared characteristics between two sets of
handwritings can provide a strong basis for a reasonable person to find that
both sets of writings were made by the same person beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Going forward, I firmly believe the FDE community needs to be more
open to developing a standard for expressing opinions in reports and
testimony that requires experts to (a) consider all the possibilities that might
have accounted for the observed evidence; (b) explain why one possibility is
more or less plausible than another; and (c) use qualitative probabilistic
statements that more accurately convey the degree of support the observed
evidence provides in favor of one proposition (possibility) over one or more
alternative propositions (possibilities).
Finally, careful thought should be given to recasting the terms of the
conclusions from a system of “words of estimative probability” to a system
of “words of estimative surprise,” consistent with and guided by Professor
Risinger’s insights on this issue reflected in his contribution to this
symposium.214 Professor Risinger’s proposed system of estimative surprise
would include a rank-order scale of words such as “mildly surprised,”
“surprised,” “quite surprised,” “greatly surprised,” “astonished,” “shocked,”
etc.215 After reading his article, another thought came to me that might also
212

See Found & Bird, supra note 192, at 59.
Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis. Latent Print
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach. U.S.
Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2012), at 134.
214
D. Michael Risinger, Leveraging Surprise: What Standards of Proof Imply That We
Want from Jurors, and What We Should Say to Them to Get It, 48 SETON HALL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
215
Id. (manuscript at 19) (on file with author).
213
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be worth pursuing, and that is to correlate each term of expression used in a
scale of estimative probability with a corresponding term of expression used
in a scale of estimative surprise, thereby providing a form of expression for
an expert to use in “describing” or “defining” the level of confidence to be
associated with the estimative probability opinion he or she has expressed in
a given case. Thus, for example, if an examiner concluded that the John Doe
of the known writing did write the questioned writing (an identification), this
conclusion would have to be annotated with (accompanied by) a statement
such as: “In reaching this conclusion, the examiner is saying that he would
be shocked to learn that John Doe did not, in fact, write the questioned
writing”; if an examiner concluded that the John Doe of the known writing
may have written the questioned writing, this conclusion would have to be
accompanied by a statement such as: “In reaching this conclusion, the
examiner is saying that he would be mildly surprised to learn that John Doe
did not, in fact, write the questioned writing.” Upon reflection, I believe
using both forms of expression (“estimative probability” and “estimative
surprise”) may provide a more transparent and reliable measure of the
subjective level of confidence an expert has in his or her conclusion
(opinion), and one which would be more easily understood by a lay juror,
and perhaps even a judge. In any event, this issue should be explored through
research studies carefully designed to evaluate how experts, judges, and lay
persons (prospective jurors) interpret these various kinds of subjective
expressions of expert belief (confidence).
iv. Support for and Cooperation with Properly Designed Black
Box Studies
All forensic feature-comparison disciplines involve a subjective
method in which perceptions and interpretations of evidence rest solely
within the observer-analyst’s mind and only the conclusions derived from
such perceptions and interpretations are known. Black box studies are
empirical studies used to estimate the reliability of a subjective method, such
as forensic handwriting analysis.
Unfortunately, the discipline of forensic handwriting analysis still lacks
robust, ground truth studies that provide empirical support for the reliability
of many of the tasks routinely performed by its practitioners, such as
distinguishing between forged and disguised (genuine but deliberately
modified) signatures. Moreover, the proficiency tests that FDEs take
annually or biannually as a requirement for maintaining their individual
certification or their laboratory’s accreditation status have been criticized as
being too easy, not reflective of actual casework, or susceptible to test-takers
colluding with one another or otherwise receiving unauthorized assistance.
Hence, if the FDE community is serious about seeking to obtain trustworthy
empirical data that supports the reliability of the opinions they express from
preforming specific handwriting examination tasks, they first need to
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develop a comprehensive laundry list of all such tasks. Once this is done,
empirical black box studies can be properly designed to obtain data for
assessing how well FDEs perform each of those tasks. Such black box
studies should be conducted by academic researchers who have no real or
apparent interest in the outcome of any such black box studies.
The FDE community should unite in their efforts to support and
cooperate with all academic researchers conducting such black box studies,
as resistance to doing so will only provide more fodder for the discipline’s
critics.
If the FDE community decides to use the Modular Forensic
Handwriting Method described in Part VII.A.2.b., supra, or a modified
version of same, white box studies should also be considered, since such
studies are designed to understand the factors that affect an examiner’s
decision at each decision point of the examination process. White box studies
can be extremely useful in determining sources of error for those tasks for
which black box studies produce high rates of inter-examiner variability (or
even intra-examiner variability).
B. Lawyers and Gatekeepers Need to Be Better Informed and More
Diligent in Scrutinizing an Expert’s Methodology
1. The Trial Lawyer
Trial lawyers need to be more proactive and make more frequent use of
in limine motions in seeking to exclude proffered handwriting identification
opinion evidence that is unreliable. This necessarily entails having
knowledge of the methodological principles and consensus standards that
have been adopted by the profession for the specific handwriting task at issue
in the case.
In preparing for a Daubert hearing or a trial, the lawyer must study the
learned treatises relied upon by practitioners and all the standards adopted
by the profession that are relevant to the handwriting task(s) at hand. Even
with such baseline knowledge, lawyers frequently remain ill-equipped to
mount an effective challenge to unreliable evidence proffered by a
handwriting expert adept at obfuscating issues affecting the reliability of
their opinions. Hence, lawyers need to consult with subject matter experts
at the pre-trial stage and not rely solely on their cross-examination skills at a
Daubert hearing or at trial. Presentation of contradictory expert testimony
by a well-credentialed and experienced expert is always preferable and more
effective in providing trial judges with the necessary baseline level of
confidence to find that a proffered handwriting expert’s testimony as related
to the task at hand is so unfounded or illogical as to warrant finding it
unreliable and inadmissible.
Reasonable access to the expertise required to expose critically flawed
and unreliable proffered expert testimony is an issue of critical importance,
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especially in criminal cases, where the defense customarily has inadequate
financial resources to obtain such expertise, notwithstanding the Supreme
Court’s recognition of a constitutional right to expert assistance.216 Trial
judges may be able to remedy this inequity of resources by authorizing the
payment of reasonable expert fees for the retention of high-quality experts
by the defense, something that is generally not as great a concern for the
prosecution.217 However, this invariably requires a motion on the part of the
defense attorney, optimally at the early stages of the case.
2. The Trial Judge
Judges need to take their gatekeeping role more seriously. All too often
they forego their mandatory duty to screen and exclude proffered opinion
evidence that is unreliable and inadmissible in favor of allowing the
traditional safeguards of cross-examination and presentation of contrary
evidence to expose the unreliability of an expert’s opinion and trial
testimony. Unfortunately, these two safeguards of our adversarial system
rest upon the trial lawyer’s skill level and the availability of resources to hire
a well-qualified and experienced rebuttal expert, neither of which are
assured. Hence, the gatekeeping role is of utmost importance in preventing
unreliable opinion evidence from reaching the fact finder.
The cause for concern in relying upon gatekeepers to exclude unreliable
opinion evidence is that most trial judges are not technically proficient when
it comes to most forensic science disciplines. They have generally not been
exposed to, or trained to identify, the kinds of flaws in examining or
evaluating evidence that produce unreliable and exaggerated expert
opinions, even in the case of pattern-matching disciplines such as
handwriting analysis. Unless judges appreciate and comprehend the
reliability issues involved in challenges to proffered opinion evidence, it is
unlikely that those issues will be addressed in a meaningful way.
To facilitate and enhance the performance of their gatekeeping
responsibility, as outlined in Part VI, supra, judges should consider
implementing the following practical measures to assist the court in
assessing the reliability of proffered opinion evidence:

216
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82–87 (1985). See also Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v.
Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert World, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1305 (2003).
217
See James Fanelli, Manhattan DA’s Office Paid Unbelievable Amount to Psychiatrist
Who Assessed Convicted Etan Patz Killer, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 29, 2017), http://www.nyd
ailynews.com/new-york/prosecutors-paid-massive-amount-expert-etan-patz-case-article-1.3
367894. The New York Daily News reported, having learned through a Freedom of
Information Law request that “the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office paid a forensic
psychiatrist $536,940 for his work as an expert witness in the two trials of Etan Patz’s killer”
whereas “[the defendant’s] court-appointed attorneys and paralegals were paid a total of
$803,000 according to the city Finance Department.” Id.
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a) routinely issue pre-trial orders directing all experts to
submit written reports or affidavits detailing the
reasoning and methods underlying their opinions; and
b) appoint a court-appointed subject matter expert in those
instances when the specialized knowledge of a
nonpartisan expert would assist the court in properly
assessing the reliability of proffered opinion evidence.
CONCLUSION
Has there been progress since the 2009 NAS Report? Yes, but not
enough, despite the NIST-OSAC efforts to improve the various disciplines
of forensic science, especially those involved in the examination and
comparison of features associated with physical or trace evidence. The FDE
community has engaged in a lot of talk, but far too little action, and the
problems associated with the reliability of handwriting identification opinion
evidence, as described and illustrated in this Article, still prevail.
Hopefully the information provided in the first five parts of this Article
will encourage and ignite members of the FDE community, as well as
members of the bench and the bar, to become more proactive in addressing
and resolving the critical issues that continue to adversely affect the
reliability of handwriting identification opinion evidence by, at the very
least, implementing the changes recommended in Part VII of this Article.

